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substituting policies aimed at rapid industrialization may in fact inhibit economic
growth, explaining why some countries have experienced lower rates of economic
development. The third chapter uses a robust econometric procedure to estimate
sector-specific productivity growth for a sample of OECD countries. It finds that
the sources of productivity growth vary widely across countries. Productivity growth
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CHAPTER I
STRUCTURAL CHANGE WITH ENDOGENOUS CREDIT CONSTRAINTS
1.1. Introduction
This chapter provides a quantitative assessment of the effect of credit market
frictions on structural change. Credit markets have been long thought to play a
critical role in the developmental path of an economy. With structural change, the
distribution of economic output shifts from agriculture to industry and then to
services. Easy access to capital markets is necessary to invest in productive capacity.
Specifically, when capital and labor are complements in agricultural production,
access to capital markets affects labor productivity. Market frictions restrict the
supply of capital to the agricultural sector, reducing the productivity of labor.
When preferences are nonhomothetic, implying that a subsistence amount of
the agricultural good must be produced, a decrease in labor productivity in the
agricultural sector implies that a disproportionate share of labor is employed in
agriculture and a lower share in the industrial sector. This reduces the rate of
structural change, resulting in delayed development and a measurable decrease in
GDP per worker.
The specific mechanism that generates credit market frictions is poor property
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rights over land. In rural households, where capital markets are underdeveloped,
landholdings can constitute the bulk of assets. When a household’s asset base
determines access to credit markets, the saleability of household assets, in this
case land, matters. Sufficient evidence exists, in the form of both recent empirical
work and legal code cited from a number of countries, that the tradeability of land
varies widely across countries. Exploiting variation in the tradeability of land, this
chapter identifies the link between property rights over land, capital investment and
structural change.
I implement a dynamic general equilibrium framework to quantify the
structural implications and welfare costs of market frictions. Empirical work on
property rights and investment indicates that land is significant both as a productive
input and as collateral in rural capital markets. These studies provide a set of
reasonable parameter values concerning property rights and the salability of land.
The model calibrated to fit this empirical evidence suggests that credit market
frictions can potentially generate cumulative output losses of close to 40% of present
discounted GDP per worker, depending on parameters. In addition, it explains over
50% of the variation in agricultural employment shares, another key impediment to
structural change. Given the extreme poverty of the poorest countries in the world,
these results show that poor property rights are an important source of stagnation.
This chapter contributes to several lines of literature. An older literature
on structural change suggests that an economy needs to achieve an adequately
2
productive agricultural sector before industrialization can occur (see Matsuyama
[55], Kogel [46] and Strulik and Weisdorf [68]). This paper maintains that result,
but highlights the importance of imperfections in credit markets in aiding that
transition. A second body of literature studies the relationship between credit
constraints and output growth, demonstrating that output may be reduced by credit
constraints that adversely affect the value of collateralized assets (see Kiyotaki and
Moore [45]). This chapter introduces simple, reduced-form, credit constraints and
demonstrates how such constraints may have lasting effects.
In addition, a large literature documents the relationship between the existence
of property rights and investment rates (see Besley [12], Carter and Olinto [15] and
Goldstein and Udry [28], amongst others). The expected result that enforceable
property rights results in greater investment rates is consistently documented.
The model adopted in this chapter builds on Gollin, Parente and Rogerson [29]
who propose a dynamic general equilibrium model of structural change. However,
Gollin et al. assume the existence of two agricultural sectors and maintain the status
quo that capital markets are perfect. Their model is used to explain variations in the
‘time to development’ where variation in the timing is exogenous. In contrast, this
chapter explains differences in the time paths of endogenous variables by exploring
variation in the degree of land rights.
Relying on the microeconomic evidence linking the value of assets to the
saleability of land, and highlighting land’s role as collateral in credit markets, the
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rest of this chapter is devoted to linking variations in the institutional framework
to the observed developmental patterns in the developing world. Section 2 provides
important background information. Section 3 reviews the literature on the subject,
and section 4 presents the model. Section 5 discusses the results and extensions of
the model and, finally, section 6 concludes.
1.2. Background
The inverse relationship between agriculture’s output share and income level
is a consistent stylized fact of economic development. The share of employment in
agriculture also steadily decreases as labor moves to the service and manufacturing
sectors. Figure 1 presents some of the evidence by country-group1.
In the original labor-surplus models (see Lewis ([53] and Todaro et al. [37]),
it is technological progress in the industrial sector that induces structural change,
while in later renditions (Matsuyama [55], Gollin et al. [29] and Echevarria [22]) the
role of technological progress in the agricultural sector also plays an important role
by releasing labor for work in other sectors. While the original labor-surplus model
did not emphasize the role of capital inputs in the primary, or agricultural, sector,
more recent models allow for the industrialization of food production. This is largely
consistent with the global pattern of food production, with labor receiving a small
1Data from http://www.oecd.org
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FIGURE 1. Agricultural GDP share
fraction of factor payments in agriculture in the developed world. In all dynamic
general equilibrium versions of these models, markets are assumed to be frictionless,
with capital accumulation in any sector governed by prices alone.
1.2.1 Institutional Framework
Well functioning credit markets are often missing in the developing world. A
common feature of the market for credit is uncertainty regarding repayment. When
repayment is uncertain, lenders may require some form of collateral in order to secure
loans. The form of collateral varies widely, and may be in the form of cash, capital
or, as the current paper explores, land. When land comprises the bulk of assets, its
role as collateral, in addition to its role as a productive asset, becomes important. It
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follows that the structure of the land market has important implication with respect
to value of land in securing loans. This motivates the structure of land markets
as a determinant of access to credit in rural, and often agricultural, sectors of the
economy.
The structure of land markets varies widely.2 For example, in Lesotho, tribal
hierarchy supersedes the national government in allocating land. Bassett notes that
the legal code governing land provided that “chiefs could revoke rights . . . and
allocate the land to families in need,” and that “land not properly cultivated for a
period of two years could be revoked and allocated to another.” The Land Reform
Act, meant to quell growing concern over customary land rights, stated that “land
remains the property of the nation and is held in trust by the king.” Though the code
permitted the conversion of customary tenure to a sellable lease right, the process
was so bureaucratic and cumbersome that sharecropping persisted as the primary
form of agricultural production. The central point remains the same: individual title
to land is absent, eliminating land as an instrument in collateral markets.
Somalia presents another example. Legislation passed in 1975 abolished
the system of customary tenure and transferred property rights over land to the
central government. The rationale was that state administered leases would provide
better tenure security than the then current system of tribal laws. However, the
bureaucratic nature of the problem implied that leaseholders were hesitant to rent
2Case studies are from Bassett [8]
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land for fear of being unable to reclaim it, and sales were administered through
the state. Indeed, a survey by Roth [67] revealed that of fifty six respondents only
one had ever sold land and seven had ever purchased it. Coupled with legislation
forbidding the ownership of more than one parcel, this greatly diminishes land’s
role as an asset. This example again highlights the importance of poor property
rights. Tenure security, while certainly improving the incentives for investment, do
not enhance land’s role as an asset (though it certainly provides for some degree
of income security). It is land’s potential role as collateral that improves access to
credit markets, a benefit that complete tenure security does not provide when land
is ultimately the property of the government.
Botswana presents a different case. Towards the end of the 1960’s a growing
concentration of elites with commensurate political power resulted in a concentration
of land in the hands of those with the ability to enforce property rights. With wealth
determining access to credit markets, the mechanization of agriculture generated
increases in the level of output and efficiency of production. Centers of agriculture
developed, with wells, irrigation, combines and tractors. Ignoring the distributional
implications of the transition, it is evident that the ability to enforce property rights
has the potential to induce the capitalization of agriculture. The evidence is visible
in figure 2, which charts the number of tractors in use for Botswana, Somalia and
Lesotho.3
3Data are from FAOSTAT, http://www.faostat.org
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FIGURE 2. Tractors in use
1.2.2 Micro evidence on Property Rights
While it is evident that property rights are imperfect, the question of “how
much so?” remains. A useful estimation of the degree of property rights is made by
Lanjouw et al. [50]. In their work they estimate the probability that a ‘landowner’
can enter into contracts to sell or rent their land to strangers using a probit
model. Because households may differentially be able to sell to family or friends the
distinction is clear, and the model conditioned on the relationship between the selling
household and purchasing parity. Their estimation is based on survey data collected
from Ecuador and reveals an interesting relationship between the saleability of land
characteristics of the market participants. First, the probability that an individual
can sell his/her land depends positively on the value of the both land and non-land
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assets. A number of other factors are significant as well. These include age and
gender of tenant, the existence of a legal document and whether the property was
previously subject to jurisdiction.
A second, and admittedly less structural estimation of the saleability of land
is provided by Besley [12]. His empirical study of the relationship between property
rights and investment in Ghana reveals that only 78% of respondents could sell their
land without first obtaining permission from a tribal or government authority. I
use this estimate as another potential candidate for the estimation of the degree of
property rights in the model.
In general, using variability in the transactability of land is a reduced form
approach to modeling credit market frictions. It could easily be argued that variation
in the ability to transact land is isomorphic to a poorly functioning financial sector.
Or, it could be the case that differences in the composition of assets, and not the
measured level of, is what drives credit market frictions. In other words, a family
might be relatively wealthy as measured in land or animals, over which property
rights are perfectly well defined, but does not possess assets that have value as
collateral in formal credit markets.
As such, the model should be interpreted with some care. A similar parameter
could represent intermediary fees in the financial sector which, if proportional to the
value of assets or the transaction, could produce identical results. A more structural
model would incorporate a more micro-founded approach that could effectively
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separate these different channels, but for the purposes of quantifying these friction,
generally defined, this will suffice.
1.3. A Brief Review of the Literature
Two sector models of economic transition begin with Lewis’s [53] work. His
argument was that there is essentially an unlimited supply of labor working in
rural agriculture that is available for employment in the industrial sector. Because
the opportunity cost of working in the industrial sector cannot be lower than the
industrial wage itself, Lewis argued that rural workers receive the average product
of their labor. This allows for a zero marginal product of labor (which would imply
a zero wage in standard marginal cost pricing models) and positive employment.
The result is what economists refer to as disguised unemployment. As industrial
production increases, labor moves out of agriculture “with their food on their backs”
and engages in industrial production. The Lewis framework was formalized using
non-homothetic preferences by, among others, Matsuyama [55] who highlights the
role of productivity growth in agriculture as a precursor to development 4. Continued
interest in the topic is evident in more recent work by Echevarria [22], Galor and
Weil [27], Kogel [46], Strulik and Weisdorf [68] and Gollin et al. [29].
A related, but more recent literature explores the role between credit market
frictions and investment. Kiyotaki and Moore [45] demonstrate that endogenous
4The original Lewis model relied on productivity advances in industry to generate economic
transition.
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credit constraints can generate large and persistent aggregate fluctuations in the
face of small shocks to productivity. In their model, negative productivity shocks
result in lower asset prices, reducing their value in collateral markets. This results
in a lower demand for investment as well as a general equilibrium effect that further
reduces the price of the asset and magnifies the original effect.
Laitner [48] specifically identifies the price of land and its role in investment
decisions. In an overlapping generations model young agents invest in land and
capital. Nonhomothetic preferences drive the result that, as incomes increase,
demand for the manufactured good increases. Because future generations value
manufactured output more, capital becomes relatively more valuable as an asset.
However, structural change is a byproduct of the model, as his central theme is the
change in asset portfolio composition.
The role of credit market frictions, and the value of land, in asset markets during
structural transition are facts that should be considered in theories of economic
development. A number of empirical papers establish that imperfect property
rights, with specific emphasis on land, can generate substantial efficiency costs in
the allocation of resources in agricultural sectors. Using survey data from China,
Benjamin and Brandt [11] find that administrative land allocation, and the absence
of efficient rental markets generates large discrepancies in worker productivity.
Specifically, worker productivity on small farms is significantly higher than on large
farms. This is consistent with a property rights approach to the problem when returns
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to scale are positive. Larger farms should have more scope for investment, increasing
worker productivity. However, the opposite obtains, and is only partially offset by
secondary labor market. Deininger and Jin[21] offer a similar prediction, namely that
the development of rural land markets would dramatically increase labor efficiency
using survey data from rural provinces in China. In their paper the development
of rental markets permits a more efficient allocation of resources and the associated
productivity gains.
Slightly contrary evidence is presented by Li [54] who argues that when
transaction costs are sufficiently high, imperfect property markets might be second
best. Carter and Olinto [15] use data from Paraguay to demonstrate that poorly
defined property rights result in greater investment in movable versus non-movable
assets. Besley [12] and Goldstein and Udry [28] find similar result using Ghanaian
data. Besley also finds evidence in favor of endogenous property rights. As
investment increases, the transferability of land increases, suggesting that sufficient
investment generates de facto ownership. Barham et al. [5] find evidence that
non-price rationing generates larger allocative inefficiencies when property rights are
poorly defined in Guatemala. Though based on capital investment among competing
firms, Claessens and Laevin [16] find that allocative investment decisions are more
efficient when property rights are well-defined.
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1.4. The Model
The model consists of a population Nt = N0(1 + γn)
t of infinitely lived
households where γn ∈ (0, 1) is the rate of population growth. Households can
be thought of as yeomen farmers who are proprietors of a unit mass of land. They
are also endowed with a unit of labor and which they supply inelastically to either
the agricultural or industrial sector.
1.4.1 Technology
1.4.1.1 Agricultural Firms
Agricultural firms are owned and operated by households. They rent labor,
land and capital to produce food using the following technology:








La,t denotes land, Na,t labor and Ka,t the quantity of capital in use. γa is the
factor neutral rate of productivity growth and I assume that φ+ µ < 1.
1.4.1.2 Industrial Firms
Industrial firms rent labor and capital and produce output according to





where γb is total factor productivity growth, and α ∈ (0, 1). Because production
is constant returns to scale firm ownership is not of concern. Firms hire all inputs in
competitive factor markets and maximize profits.
1.4.1.3 Banks
Finally, a competitive banking sector plays two roles in the economy. First, in
any time period t, they issue a one-period asset to households in exchange for the
households’ savings, St. Formally, they offer a return of r̄t on each unit of household
savings.
Second, they operate an investment technology that permits the one-to-one
conversion of savings today into capital which becomes available for use in the next
period. Therefore, Kt+1 = St. Banks then lend capital to firms for use in production,










Kt+1 = St (1.4)
Kt+1 = Ka,t+1 +Ky,t+1 (1.5)
Consider firms in the banking sector. If it were the case that rky ,t+1 6= rka,t+1
then banks would only be willing to lend to the sector in which rt is higher. This has
the effect of reducing the rate of return on capital in that sector, until in equilibrium
we must have
rky ,t+1 = rka,t+1 = r̄t (1.6)
It is assumed that agricultural firms enter within-period contracts with banks
to buy capital. Capital is delivered at the beginning of the time period, firms produce
output, and then pay for capital following production. However, agricultural firms
may choose to default on their obligation to pay for capital. Because there is the
potential for default, banks will require collateral to secure the loans for agricultural
capital. Use of price to equate the expected return on capital would fail because
it increases the marginal cost of repayment, therefore increasing the likelihood of
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default. Agricultural producers must then use their land as collateral to secure
capital for use in production. If agricultural producers default, banks collect their
land. By assumption capital depreciates fully, so there is none to be recovered.
Whether agricultural firms default on a loan depends on their incentives. The
cost of repayment in time period t is rka,tKa,t and the expected cost of default is
ρpl,tLt. ρ can be interpreted as either the probability that the land can be recovered
and liquidated, or the fraction of the value of land that can be recovered. This
introduces a mechanism by which the fungibility of land as an asset influences the






which is effectively a participation constraint on the part of banks. Because
households will choose to default for any value of Ka,t > K̂a,t, banks would never
agree to issue capital in excess of K̂a,t.
1.4.2 Implications of the credit constraint
The incentive compatibility constraint lends itself to a rather simple analysis.






and the constraint on the quantity of capital that will be lent (1.7).
The ‘gap’ in credit markets, K̃a,t is the difference between demand and
(restricted) supply5 or
K̂a,t =
(1− φ− µ)āNt − ρpl,tLt
r̄t
(1.9)







1 + γb − β
)]
(1.10)





1− φ− µ− ρφ
1 + γb
1 + γb − β
)
(1.11)
This expression will be positive when the constraint binds and equal to zero
when it does not. The likelihood of a gap depends negatively on φ. When φ falls,
land’s share of factor payments decreases, causing a fall in the price of land and
therefore the cost of borrowing. At the same time, a large φ reduces the demand
for capital because it implies that the elasticity of output with respect to capital is
smaller. An increase in µ decreases the probability of the gap because it reduces the
demand for capital and has no impact on the borrowing constraint.
5Here I substitute r̄t for rka,t. Per 1.6, they are equivalent in equilibrium.
6See Appendix A for derivation.
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Total factor productivity growth in manufacturing decreases the likelihood
that the constraint binds because of its depressive effect on the price of land. The
population, Nt affects only the magnitude of the constraint. If the parameters dictate
that it binds, then a larger population increases the demand for capital and the
constraint on how much can be accumulated at the same rate, causing a proportional
increase in the gap. The interest rate on capital induces a proportional change in
the magnitude of the gap.
1.4.3 Households
Households consume a manufactured good, ct, and an agricultural good at.
Their preferences are specifically chosen to highlight the fact that food is a necessity.
The following utility function maintains analytical simplicity and is consistent with











ln(ct) + ā if at ≥ ā
at if at < ā
where ct denotes the consumption of a manufactured good, and at denotes








where β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor. Agents are paid in claims to
output. The output of the manufacturing sector can be either consumed as ct or
saved as St. The portion that is saved is deposited with the banking sector where it
is converted into capital for use in production the following time period, receiving a
rate of return r̄t. In addition to income earned from last period’s savings, household
earn rental income from land, rl,t and labor income wt.
Importantly, when the households are credit-constrained they may be unable
to allocate as much capital to the agricultural sector as they would like. If
agricultural capital is subject to the credit constraint (1.7) it may be the case that
its rate of return exceeds that of capital in the industrial sector. However, because
all capital is rented in a competitive market, borrowers pay the same rate. This
implies that households receive an excess rate of return on agricultural capital,
which will be denoted πt. When the credit constraint does not bind, πt = 0. When
it does bind, it represents the value of agricultural output net of factor payments.
This does not materially affect the intertemporal problem: the rate of return on
savings is determined by the rental rate in industry, as it represents the allocation
of any marginal unit of capital.
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Households’ utility maximization problem is subject to
[Ntct + St]pc,t +Ntat + pl,t(Lt+1 − Lt) ≤ wtNt + r̄tSt−1 + rl,tLt + πt (1.13)
and the evolution of the capital stock is governed by (1.4). The budget constraint
is similar to that proposed in Farmer and Wendner [25], eq. 12. Note first that in
equilibrium Lt+1 = Lt and all terms on the right-hand side represent income. Because
they represent the output of the same sector in a real economy, the price applied to
investment and consumption is the same, and agricultural output is numeraire.









The model proceeds as follows: At the beginning of time period t, banks hold
savings St−1 and carry debt to households. They make a capital portfolio choice,
subject to the constraint (1.5). Capital is delivered, factors are allocated, and
production takes place. Following production, factor payments are issued, loans
repaid, the households’ purchase the output of the industrial sector, and make their
consumption/savings decision. This determines St and therefore Kt+1. The following


















a,t = wt (1.16)















y,t = rky ,t (1.19)
Lt = L̄ (1.20)
Na,t +Ny,t = Nt (1.21)
Ky,t +Ka,t = Kt (1.22)






To calibrate the agricultural technology I rely on a number of empirical studies.
Echevarria [23] uses data from several Canadian provinces to calculate the income
shares of land, labor and capital in agricultural production. Though her work uses
data from a fully developed country, her parameter estimates are close to those
suggested by studies from developing countries. Hayami and Rutton [38] estimate
an agricultural production function in which capital inputs broadly describe the use
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of machinery as well as livestock. Of course, these depart from the standard notion
of capital, but evidence exists to suggest that household may accumulate livestock as
a form of insurance against uncertain outcomes (see Rozenzweig [66]), implying that
its dual role in production and as an asset bring it quite close to standard notions of
capital.
Bassett [8] estimates agricultural income shares using data from the Punjab
region of Pakistan. Capital includes plow, fertilizer as well as seed. The final set of
estimates used in calibration are those suggested by Gollin, Parente and Rogerson
[29]. Their work draws on empirical estimates of income shares from the United
Kingdom during the industrial revolution.
An additional set of estimates are provided by the African Association
of Agricultural Economists. While providing useful insight into the nature of
agricultural technology in the developing world, I omit them from the calibration
exercise because they suggest that technology is strongly increasing returns to scale.
This alone would result in a higher rate of growth, and be of little help in the way
of comparative static analysis.
The full set of parameters are presented in table 1.
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Three-factor agricultural technology
Source Land Labor Capital
Echevarria 0.096-0.223 0.295-0.653 0.251-0.483
Battese et al. 0.261-0.382 0.107-0.176 0.464-0.716
Hayami et al. 0.097-0.117 0.336-0.490 0.422-0.545
AAAE 0.72 0.75 0.07









TABLE 1. Parameter estimates: technology
I make use of data provided in Lanjouw et al. [50] and Besley [12] to calibrate
the credit constraint. Lanjouw et al. uses a probit regression to estimate the
probability that an individual can sell land to a stranger and the probability that
an individual can rent property to a stranger Their results are based on survey
data from Ecuador. Besley [12] uses survey data from Ghana to estimate the effect
of property rights on the rate of investment in agricultural areas, and reports the
fraction of tenants who can sell their land without permission. These estimates
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are quite different, but given the paucity of empirical work that estimates such a
parameter, these results will serve our present needs. The coefficients are presented
in table 2.
Source ρ ∈ (0, 1)
Besley a 0.78
Lanjouw et al. b 0.33/0.22
a Besley reports the fraction of households that could
sell their land without tribal authority.
b Lanjouw reports the unconditional probability that a
household may transact land with a non-relative.
TABLE 2. Parameter estimates: property
rights
The final parameter, β, is assumed to be 0.96.
1.5.2 Computational Strategy
To compute the equilibrium growth path I proceed as follows: The economy is
endowed with an initial capital stock sufficient to produce the minimum amount of
the agricultural output (āNt) given competitive markets. Otherwise, the economy
would allocate all capital to agriculture, upon which it would depreciate fully, and
the exercise terminates. Given an initial stock of capital, factor arbitrage according
to equations 1.15 - 1.19 yields the competitive allocation and prices. This determines
the initial output of the manufacturing sector. At this point I implement a shooting
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must always be satisfied. Moreover, given an exogenous rate of total factor
productivity growth,
(1 + γb)(1 + γn) = βr̄t (1.26)
where r̄t = (1 + γb)
t(1− α)Nαt K
−α











Given an initial capital endowment, and corresponding output Yy,t a guess for
the initial consumption-savings decision is initiated. If the time path, conditional on
an initial guess, results in a terminal capital stock greater than Ky,T then the initial
guess is adjusted accordingly. I repeat the procedure until the time path converges
to within a tolerance of the terminal capital stock.
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In addition, the mechanics of the model imply that I place some ad hoc
restrictions on the allocation of capital. Consider the following:
(
āNt





is the minimum amount of capital necessary to produce the subsistence level of food
employing all labor in agriculture. If Ka,t < (1.28) then Na,t = N0(1 + γn)
t which
implies that Ny,t = 0 and therefore Yy,t = 0. Given zero industrial output, and thus
a zero upper bound on savings, it must be that Kt+1 = 0 which is a trivial result.









Intuitively this is the requirement that the level of capital in agriculture is high
enough that there is some excess supply of labor, given the perfectly inelastic demand
for food. Because capital is required to produce agricultural output, this guarantees
a labor surplus for industry, which in turn guarantees industrial output for use in
subsequent time periods.
1.6. Quantitative Results
I make use of the production function parameters estimated in Bassett [8],
Hayami et al. [38] and Gollin et al. [29]. The point estimates in Echevarria are
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sufficiently close to those in Bassett that using both sets of estimates would provide
little additional insight, and I avoid the use of the parameter estimates from the
AAAE because of the implication that the technology is increasing returns to scale.
In addition to the parameter estimates provided by Besley [12] and Lanjouw [50] I
report the counter-factual case of no probability of being able to sell land (ρ ≃ 0). I
consider ρ ≃ 0 to approximate the case in which land is entirely government owned,
as mentioned in the Somali and Mosotho case studies cited above. This is admittedly
less rigorous than the use of an appropriately calibrated value, but provides a useful
reference point. Note that the constraint in 1.11 provides an explicit limit on ρ
above which the constraint will not bind. For example, the parameterization implied
by Hayami requires ρ < .228 for the constraint to bind. This implies a difference
between ρ = .22 and ρ = 0.33, but no difference for values of ρ greater than 0.33.
Because the results of the model are identical for ρ = 0.78 and ρ = 1, ρ = 0.78 is
considered first best. For all cases the midpoints of the factor productivity growth
estimates are used.
Graphical results are presented in Appendix B. The results presented are for the
parameter values suggested by Hayami et al. Different factor shares affect the time




The time paths for the level of consumption reveal that slight changes in
property rights can have lasting, and even permanent effects on consumption levels.
Consider first parameter values of ρ = 0.33 and ρ = 0.78. Per the constraint in 1.7,
borrowers of agricultural capital will not be constrained along the balanced growth
path. However, because the model is a two-sector economy, there are important
dynamic implications before the economy approximates the balanced growth path.
During periods for which the majority of resources are employed in the agricultural
sector, the rental rate of land is low relative to the balanced growth path values (see
figure 3). This implies that the borrowing constraint may bind before the economy
has reached the balanced growth path, and because the state variable (capital) is
endogenous, this has lasting effects.
The net effect in the simulation is an additional 6 time periods for which the
constraint binds. This is arguably insignificant in the context of an infinitely lived
economy where the empirical counterpart of a time period is one year, but it has
permanent effects on consumption, and therefore welfare, for each of the 150 time
periods in the simulation.
As ρ falls to 0.22 the predicted gap in demand becomes positive.7 For this
calibrated value the economy is subject to the constraint on capital accumulation for
7Note that for current parameter values the gap will be positive if (0.487− ρ(0.1) 1.006
0.046
) > 0, or
ρ > 0.2226.
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the duration of the simulation which results in significant impacts on consumption
levels and welfare. The more extreme case of ρ = 0.01 implies an even more severe
penalty. These costs in terms of consumption occur because the agricultural sector
is severely constrained in its ability to use capital. As the level of capital employed is
small, a larger share of the population is required to produce the subsistence amount
of food. This severely constrains the resources that are available for the industrial
sector, and prevents the economy from reaching a self-sustaining level of industrial
output under which sufficient capital is produced at a low enough cost that it can
be used as the primary input in agricultural production.
1.6.2 Capital
An initially low level of capital precedes the transition to a regime where capital
accumulates at a rate that depends on the parameters of the model. The best case
scenario, for which ρ = 0.78, is characterized by an initially constant level of capital
followed by a transition to capital accumulation unperturbed by the borrowing
constraint. The capital stock is initially constant because productivity gains in the
industrial sector are insufficient to produce capital in excess of that required to
reproduce capital required in agriculture. Effectively, increases in industrial output
allow for factor substitution (agriculture becomes more capital intensive) permitting
increased use of labor in industry. As total factor productivity increases, the rise
in the rental rate of capital justifies an increased savings rate and capital begins to
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accumulate.
Some components of the capital path are artifacts of the model. Initially the
actual capital stock may decline, which is an artifact of the model. Per our earlier
discussion, the need for a minimal amount of agricultural capital is such that this
lower bound, given in 1.29, governs the capital stock. Eventually, with sufficient
increases in total factor productivity, which lower the price of output, capital begins
to accumulate. However, the delay initiated by imperfections in the market for
agricultural capital again has lasting effects.
The best case scenario, ρ = 0.78 displays an initially constant level of aggregate
capital. During this time, output of the industrial sector is just sufficient to replace
existing capital and satisfy demand for the consumption good. Given sufficient time,
and a commensurate increase in total factor productivity, capital is produced in
sufficient quantities to be both consumed and saved, which introduces the ‘modern
growth period’ in the model.
For the case characterized by poorer property rights, the level of capital stock
may initially decline. When this is the case, the capital stock is constrained by the
equality in 1.29, which requires that the capital stock not fall below a threshold level
lest it be insufficient to produce even the required quantity of the agricultural good
in the subsequent period. For intermediate values of ρ it converges to the first best
capital path, but the initial decline in capital has permanent effects on the level of
welfare. For the extreme case of ρ = .01 there is a lasting effect, and the capital stock
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converges to a different path that is permanently below the one that corresponds to
perfectly tradeable land.
In either case, it is evident that poor land rights are sufficient to drive
substantial delays in capital accumulation. Even though the level of capital may
converge to the first-best level, there are permanent welfare costs associated with
initial constraints governing its allocation.
1.6.3 Employment Shares
The model predicts substantial delays in the movement of labor from the
agricultural to the industrial sector. Small changes in property rights have
permanent effects, visible in the level differences in the share of labor employed in
the agricultural sector. Though the differences appear substantial, they tend to
under-predict the degree of of rural-urban labor migration.
Table 3 reports the Food and Agriculture Association’s projected agricultural
employment shares in 2020, along with those predicted by the model for various
parameter values. The labor shares generated in the model are calculated by
comparing the share of labor for equivalent per capita incomes. Data on per capita
incomes suggests that least developed economies (LDC’s) are approximately 75
years behind the developed countries in terms of per capita income given growth
rates. I assume for comparative purposes that property rights in North America
are represented by values of ρ > .33, that the case study from Ecuador (ρ = 0.22)
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applies to South America, and that LDC’s represent the group for which property
rights are the most poorly defined (ρ = 0.01).
FAO Model
Region Labor Share (%) Parameter value (ρ) Labor Share (%)
North America 1.49 > 0.33 1.58
South America 12.35 0.22 7.91
LDC’s 89.67 0.01 49.96
TABLE 3. Agricultural Employment Shares
The tendency of the model to under-predict the share of agricultural labor is
likely due to the fact that the model omits many important determinants of the rural-
urban labor migration decision, including uncertainty with respect to employment
and the structure of wages. However, the results in the model are driven by a single
parameter, which is capable of explaining a significant share of the variation in
employment shares by sector. This adds credence to the claim that landed property
rights are an important determinant of economic development.
1.6.4 GDP
Relying on the gross value of output is a broad measure of welfare, the modified
model generates a quantifiable loss relative to the perfect case of perfect property









Table 4 presents the results, for 250 time periods given each parametrization.
The difference in welfare loss for the different specifications is alarming. The
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Hayami et al.
ρ = 0.78 ρ = 0.33 ρ = 0.22 ρ = 0.01
0.0% 13.87% 25.38% 27.71%
Bassett et al.
ρ = 0.78 ρ = 0.33 ρ = 0.22 ρ = 0.01
0.0% 22.80% 39.15% 43.91%
Gollin et al.
ρ = 0.78 ρ = 0.33 ρ = 0.22 ρ = 0.01
0.0% 0.008% 0.013% 5.9%
TABLE 4. per capita GDP loss
Gollin et al. parametrization reports a relatively small welfare loss for given values
of ρ. This is due to the disproportionately small share of factor payments received
by capital. A smaller factor share accruing to capital implies a lower interest rate in
equilibrium, which implies that present consumption is less costly. This results in a
lower rate of capital accumulation, and lower future output. Because differences in
GDP are driven by differences in the output of the industrial sector, a lower rate of
capital accumulation results in lower future GDP.
Alternatively, consider the cross-sectional per capita GDP implications.
Evaluating per GDP at time period t = 250 reveals the predicted level difference
as it depends on variation in property rights alone.
The model predicts a per capita GDP cost of close to 40% relative to the first
best. This is substantially less than current variation in per capita incomes (per
capita income in Luxembourg is more than 240 times that in Liberia!) but credit
market frictions alone are capable of explaining a large degree of the variation in per
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Hayami et al.
ρ = 0.78 ρ = 0.33 ρ = 0.22 ρ = 0.01
0.0% 0.0% 24.62% 42.54%
Battese et al.
ρ = 0.78 ρ = 0.33 ρ = 0.22 ρ = 0.01
0.0% 0.0% 31.56% 48.71%
Gollin et al.
ρ = 0.78 ρ = 0.33 ρ = 0.22 ρ = 0.01
0.0% 0.0% 1.48% 2.13%
TABLE 5. End of simulation per capita GDP loss
capita incomes. The previous argument, that these results are driven by variation
in a single parameter applies equally here. A multitude of factors are responsible
for variation in income levels, among them landed property rights. That they are
capable in a relatively simple growth model of explaining this much variation in
output levels highlights them as an important policy matter.
1.7. Conclusion
This chapter provides a quantitative assessment of credit market frictions
induced by imperfect land markets. It shows that the collateral value of land has
significant implications with respect to structural change in developing economies.
Specifically, poor property rights lower the value of household assets by reducing the
tradability of land. When wealth determines access to credit markets a household’s
ability to invest in capital may be severely constrained. This reduces the agricultural
sector’s ability to accumulate capital, and results in a disproportionate share of labor
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employed in the agricultural sector. This inhibits both structural change, as well as
aggregate economic growth. For reasonable parameter values the model generates
quantifiable, and significant, welfare losses.
Using a dynamic general equilibrium framework, and empirical evidence on
both property rights and agricultural technologies, the model estimates several
important time series. The calibrated model predicts the small changes in the degree
of property rights, measured as the probability of being able to transact land, can
have permanent effects of the level of structural change, as well as output.
The model demonstrates that imperfect property rights can account for up to
40% of GDP differences and over half of the variation in agricultural employment
shares across countries as a function of property rights over land alone. This is
a contribution to the current literature on structural change in which the role for
credit market imperfections is largely ignored. In addition to substantial variation
in output, the model explains a significant share of labor migration from agriculture
to industry which, in addition to the GDP losses, signal significant welfare losses,
quantified by present value utility streams.
The model suggests an important policy implication: land reform efforts,
especially those cited in the Somali case, are inadequate to the extent that they are
expected to achieve developmental gains. Tenure security, while certainly superior to
the absence of property rights, does not endow the tenant with the ability to exploit
land’s potential role as an asset. While it results in productivity gains and greater
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security of incomes, it falls short of providing the population of landowners with
the means necessary to access credit markets. Land reform policy, where applicable,
needs to emphasize the private ownership of land, which is distinctly different from
tenure security.
Several future areas of research are evident. Because landholding are often
unequally distributed, and access to capital may be determined by the size of
landholdings, an exploration of the relationship between wealth heterogeneity and
economic development may yield important insights. In addition, factor endowments
that favor certain types of agricultural investment may be more or less conducive
to investment in agriculture. These topics, amongst others, are sure to provide
valuable insight into the mechanisms that make economic development a more
natural outcome in some cases, and an ongoing struggle in others.
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CHAPTER II
IMPORT SUBSTITUTING INDUSTRIALIZATION AND TECHNOLOGICAL
CROWDING OUT
2.1. Introduction
This chapter demonstrates that adopting foreign technologies can be growth
reducing if the use of imported technology crowds out domestic innovation. More
specifically, when the adoption of imported technologies is costly, fewer resources
may be devoted to domestic, productivity enhancing, research activities. Because
productivity gains derive from two sources, differences in the costs of development
between them have implications with respect to aggregate productivity growth.
When the adoption of technologies from abroad is costly, the balanced growth path
is characterized by a disproportionate share of resources dedicated to their adoption,
and thus a lower share of resources employed in potentially more productive domestic
development. As the rate of productivity growth determines equilibrium income
levels, this has the potential to explain GDP differences as a function of the cost of
adopting foreign technologies.
The intent is to explain the variety of outcomes associated with import
substitution industrialization policies. Several developing countries, as a result of
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policies undertaken in the post-World War II era, have been appropriately labeled
“import substituting industrializers.” Their aim, almost universally, was to protect
domestic industry from the more competitive global markets, permitting fledgling
industries to develop.
However, many countries suffered from the inability to effectively begin
industrialization without importing a specific subset of goods from abroad. These
included basic technologies as well as intermediate industrial inputs which in some
cases represented products with a substantial amount of embodied technology. A
common strategy was thus to subsidize, either directly or via currency programs, the
intermediate inputs necessary for industrialization. A characteristic of many import-
substituting countries was to procure through great effort the inputs necessary for
industries whose output was protected under the import-substitution regime. The
focus of this paper is not the protected output markets, but rather the crucial input
markets that were also distorted in the race to development.
As an example, Colistete [19] states that “a strategy favored by local companies
was to establish partnerships with foreign companies to import, assimilate and
adapt technologies” in describing Brazilian automobile manufacturers affinity for
relying on foreign technology to develop a manufacturing base for replacement parts.
Another, more dramatic, example is the construction of the Akosombo Dam in
Ghana, a project that relied exclusively on technological support from American
firms. When the American firms financing the project realized that profits from the
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project (centered primarily on the production of aluminum) had been overstated,
they withdrew from the project, leaving behind a monument to failed economic
development.
Both of these are clear examples of strong reliance on foreign technologiy
to develop a domestic manufacturing sector. The Brazilian experience with
automobiles, which relied heavily on German technology, was largely unsuccessful.
The Ghanaian experience is a stark example of the difficulty surrounding use of
technology well in advance of the domestic frontier, and reminds us that technological
adoption is far from frictionless.
The central point is that imported technologies have the potential to mitigate
domestic technological progress, even though they effectively embody a much more
advanced technology than the importing country is capable of producing. This
mechanism helps to explain why some import-substitution industrialization strategies
resulted in lower long run rates of industrial, and overall economic, growth, despite
the fact that they were heavily dependent on the use of technologies from more
technologically advanced economies. It provides a formal exposition of why import-
substituting policies, many of which continue today, may be counter-productive.
Moreover, in an era where technological progress is understood to be a fundamental
determinant of long run economic progress, it reiterates questions raised in Grossman
et al [33] regarding the potential benefit of having access to a technolgies well in
advance of those that have been developed domestically.
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The implications of the model differ from a wide body of research that
argues that the diffusion of ideas should generate convergence in incomes levels
(see Sala-i-Martin [6], Hansen and Prescott[36] and Benhabib et al.[10], amongst
others). However, their results are dependent on the costless flow of ideas, and
the presumption that new technologies can be mimicked more easily than they
can be generated. Parente and Prescott[60] demonstrate that even small costs of
adoption are sufficient to generate disparities in incomes levels on par with what
we observe today. Acemoglu and Zilibotti [2] show that the costless flow of ideas
is irrelevant when technologies are human capital specific and human capital levels
differ between economies. These latter examples corroborate the notion that frictions
in the diffusion of ideas are an important concept when considering technology
adoption.
The empirical evidence is less conclusive than one might imagine. A well
received paper by Coe and Helpman [18] finds empirical support for increases in total
factor productivity as a function of the level of research and development spending
of trade partners, weighted by trade patterns. Park [61] finds similar evidence.
However, both studies rely on data from OECD countries, which brings into question
the true costs of adopting ideas, given similar levels of human capital. Indeed,
Keller [43] turns both paper on their head by demonstrating that randomly matched
trade partners generate larger spillovers using the same data! Given the theoretical
and empirical treatment of the idea in Parente and Prescott I find the costly
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adoption of foreign technologies a plausible assumption. An important contribution
of this chapter is that it defines the flow of technology as a function of human
capital differences. This provides a mechanism by which imported technologies yield
different benefits.
The results of this chapter suggest that increases in the level of technology
embodied in imports can result in lower growth rates. The effect is stronger for
countries that are poorer and less educated on average (i.e. face significant costs of
adoption) and insignificant or slightly positive for countries in higher income groups.
In other words, holding constant the level of education and income, an increase in the
level of technology embodied in imports results in lower future growth rates. This
effect is strongest for groups of countries classified as low and middle income, and
even stronger for countries that have been labeled ‘import-substituters,’ regardless
of their income level. This helps to explain why import substitution policies have
not seen results on par with expectation.
The primary result of the model, that policies intended to induce rapid
industrialization are growth reducing begs an interesting question: “Why would
a government support such a policy?” While the current paper does not explicitly
model these important additions, several sources point to reasonable justifications
for such policies. Bridgman et al. [13] demonstrate that the ability of small coalitions
to overcome free-rider problems may result in the adoption of policies that block new
technologies. In addition, these policies were pursued during an era in which they
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often appeared succesful. The Soviet Union, which aggressively pursued oil exports
with the intent of amassing foreign currency did so with the end goal of buying
inputs for industrialization(see Yergin [72]). Initially, onlookers viewed the Soviet
Union as a force of industrialization, long before its eventual collapse. Another
explanation is offered by Grabowski et al. [30], who state that “the 1950’s were
dominated by theories in support of import substitution.” They follow by explaining:
“a number of . . . events. . .dispelled the myths associated with the success of
import-substitution.” It seems reasonable then, to think that these policies seemed
legitimate for a period, and were pursued with the expectation of success.
The following section continues a brief review of related literature; section 4
develops a theoretical model. Section 5 then presents the regression results and
section 6 concludes.
2.2. Review of the Literature
The current paper uses an analytical framework that extends the endogenous
growth literature popularized by Romer[64]. Specifically it is modeled on Grossman
and Helpman [34], a continuous variant of Romer’s work. This framework’s flexibility
allows for the consideration of both trade in goods and trade in ideas, a central
theme of this chapter. In addition, yields analytical results that are both intuitive
and simple. The popularity and analytical flexibility of the model make it a natural
choice for the current work.
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Building on the same class of models, Grossman and Helpman[33] model the
dynamic gains from trade in goods and ideas in a number of different circumstances.
An early example, Grossman and Helpman[34], demonstrates that when one industry
generates a spillover, that a subsidy can achieve the first best outcome in the
absence of endogenous growth, and a contemporaneous publication, Grossman and
Helpman[33] considers the relationship between trade and spillovers in an endogenous
growth setting. Not surprising, they find that when spillovers are present, that tariffs
on imports reduce growth. However, their paper does not address the specific nature
of the relationship between spillovers and growth, leaving functional forms general.
Recent extensions to this line of research include Kiley [44], Acemoglu [1],
Acemoglu and Zilibotti [2] and Grossman et al. [35]. These papers collectively argue
that even when all technologies are freely available, differences in factor intensities or
technologies that are human-capital specific can overturn the result that the costless
flow of ideas is universally beneficial. At the other end of the spectrum, Young [74]
and Yifu-Lin [73] argue that under-developed countries may be at a first best in
autarky or behind the technological frontier respectively.
Other efforts at analyzing protective policies include Clemhout and Wan[17]
and Melitz[56]. Each demonstrate that the dynamic benefits may exceed that
temporary costs of industry protection when increasing returns (a form of market
failure) are present. Ros [65] echoes this intuition, arguing that developing economies
might achieve higher growth rates by placing tariffs on import-competing goods.
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Rebelo[62] develops an endogenous growth framework and demonstrates that taxes
in developing countries may be growth-reducing under certain conditions, and Lee[51]
finds empirical evidence that less government intervention is associated with higher
growth rates. All of these works, and others (Krueger [47] for example), suggest that
there is a potential role for government intervention with respect to trade policies
and growth. Moreover, this relationship is more potent when trade in ideas and
trade in goods are mutually dependent. This chapter maintains that trade in goods
and ideas are complementary, but argues that the adoption of ideas may generate
excessive costs. The end result, and a contribution of the paper, is that these policies
may be appropriate for some countries, and harmful for others.
Which conditions must exist, and how industrialization via the exchange of
goods and ideas is achieved, is a subject of much debate. Rodrik [63] suggests
that a combination of government intervention and a relatively large human capital
endowment are the reason for the successes of South Korea and Taiwan. Specifically
the government worked to solve a coordination failure at the industry level. While
South Korea and Taiwan practiced traditional import-substitution policies with
respect to final output prior to their success in export markets, they still needed
certain raw materials and intermediate inputs as part of the production process which
were obtained and distributed under government jurisdiction. Indeed, a substantial
component of South Korea’s development strategy was government support of cheap
capital for industries deemed important in the pursuit of industrialization. An
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additional distinction that must be made, according to Rodrik, was that these
countries benefitted from relatively rigorous education systems, and in the case of
South Korea substantial industrial training due to ties with Japan. Education and
benevolent governance were absent in countries with poorer outcomes as governments
were more likely to seek private benefits from industrialization. This separates South
Korea from countries with similar policies, like Brazil and Mexico, where similar
policies existed (recall Brazil’s barriers to automobile trade but affinity for German
components) but education levels fall far below South Korea. The Barro-Lee data set
reports 1.4 years of primary education for Brazil in 1960 and 4.3 for Korea! In 2010
the numbers are 7.5 and 11.8 respectively, and Mexico’s numbers align closely wiht
Brazil’s. This points to a significant gap in the ability to absorb new technologies,
and motivates Rodrik’s argument.
Industrial sectors consistently failed to reach self-sustaining levels of growth.
Balance of payments crises as a result of fiscal mismanagement often led countries
to turn to the international organizations for assistance. The resulting rate of
technological advance was typically unimpressive, and balance of payments crises
owing to overvalued exchange rates resulted in currency devaluations that brought
progress to a halt. In sum, artificial support of the industrial sectors is an unsure
means of sustaining growth. Westphal and Pack [59] state that
“it has been found that firms cannot achieve or maintain international
competitiveness without technological effort. Experience in production,
and in investment to expand production, is necessary for gaining the
capability needed for international competitiveness.”
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and follow it by stating
“there are substantial information and absorption costs for the acquisition
of even non-proprietary technologies.”
These quotes suggest the need for a formal analysis of policies intended to
boost industrial progress, but do so via programs that rely on substitution towards
imported goods that effectively crowd out the domestic learning process.
These sentiments do not imply that there are no potential benefits from
trade in goods and ideas. Lee [51] expands the endogenous growth framework of
Rebelo [62] to show that imported capital goods can increase the growth rate of
a developing economy. The empirical component of Lee’s paper demonstrates a
positive relationship between the ratio of capital goods imports to total investment
and income growth is positive. However, this result is an artifact of capital
accumulation, rather than technological progress, being the primary source of
economic growth in Lee’s model.
2.3. The Model
The model consists of a small open economy populated by L̄ homogeneous
agents with identical instantaneous utility functions
U(ct) = ln(ct) (2.1)
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, α ∈ (0, 1) (2.2)
Production is constant returns to scale, and depends on the use of foreign-
derived, denoted nf , and domestically derived intermediate inputs, denoted nd.
This functional form implies that all intermediate goods have the same elasticity of
substitution, 1
1−α
, and that constant, though not necessarily equal, shares of income
will be spent on each.
The instantaneous utility function implies that the lifetime utility function of





e−ρt ln ctdt (2.3)
2.3.1 Industry
There are explicitly two types of industrial inputs, each having the same value
in production. The first type, sub-scripted d must first be developed domestically
and then manufactured. The second type is copied (or adopted from foreign abroad),
and sub-scripted with an f . I assume that there is a limitless stock of ideas available
to be copied. The development of both types of intermediate goods takes place in
an active research and development sector which uses labor as the sole productive










where Li is the labor employed in research sector i ∈ {d, f} and ni the number
of previously-developed goods in sector i at time t. a and b denote the labor
productivites in each sector. This formulation requires that public returns to the
development of ideas depend generally on the number of both domestic and foreign
inputs that have been used. Romer [64] considers cases where f(nd, nf ) = 1 and
f(nd, nf ) = n. The functional form here has implications for whether there is growth
in equilibrium.
Once developed, domestic intermediate goods must then be manufactured.
The technology for producing goods domestically (regardless of whether they were
developed domestically or copied) is linear in labor, with each unit requiring one unit
of labor per unit of time to manufacture.
2.3.2 General Equilibrium
Equilibrium in the model consists of two independent problems, one static and
one dynamic. We will proceed by first analyzing the static equilibrium, and proceed
to the dynamic, general equilibrium of the model.
Consumers, who wish to maximize utility from the manufactured good will do
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where n = nf + nd.
Given demands for each intermediate good, potential firms face a cost wa(1−σd)
f(nd,nf )
to develop an idea domestically or
wb(1−σf )
f(nd,nf )
to copy a foreign idea where σi ∈ {0, 1}
denotes a government subsidy to the cost of technology adoption. This is the
mechanism in the model by which the government can strategically use proceeds
from the tax levied on exports to subsidize technological progress.
In either case, firms developing a new blueprint are granted an indefinite patent
and corresponding stream of profits.1 Once they have developed an idea, they must
1Bertrand price competition ensures that, in equilibrium, no firm would choose to develop the
same intermediate good and enter, as they would never recover their initial capital outlay
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manufacture the intermediate good, done using 1:1 labor input-output technology.
Their profit maximization problem is
πi = [pi − w]ki (2.7)





which applies to all intermediate goods.
To develop an idea requires a
f(nd,nf )
units of labor at cost wa(1−σd)
f(nd,nf )
, and the
cost of adopting a foreign technology is
wb(1−σf )
f(nd,nf )
. Increases in the number of existing
firms reduce the per firm rate of profit. Firms will enter until the value of the present
discounted stream of profits that a monopolist accrues is driven down to the cost of















e−r(τ−t)πi(τ)dτ, i ∈ {d, f} (2.11)





e−r(τ−t)π(τ)dτ − π(τ) = rv − πi (2.12)
provides an equilibrium relationship between the interest and discount rates, profits,
and the value of the firm which will be used to characterize equilibrium below.
Given that nd goods are produced domestically, their manufacture requires ndki
units of labor. The nf foreign technology-based goods require nfki units of labor in





b units of labor are employed
in the research sector.






This implies that the value of a firm is equal to the present discounted value of
future profits. As per above, equality between the cost of a new idea and the value














The dynamic component of equilibrium requires that consumers maximize their
present discounted utility functions. The present framework makes the assumption of
perfect capital markets. This implies that all new inventions are financed by loans to
consumers, who then receive the stream of dividends earned by the monopolistically





















where λ is the LaGrange multiplier. Noting that ptct = E and differentiating
with respect to time yields the following expression:
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= r − ρ (2.18)
which is the familiar result that the level of expenditures will be increasing through
time if the interest rate is greater than the discount rate, and vice versa. By
normalizing nominal expenditures to 1 (E = 1) we have that r = ρ, as is standard
in this class of models.




Ei, i ∈ {d, f} (2.19)










nf (1− σf )
(2.20)





. This is a minor
restriction that maintains equality in the value of research and development in both
the domestic and foreign based sectors.
2Because all firms face the same marginal cost of production, and thus behave symmetrically,
subscripts have been dropped.
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2.3.3 Balanced Growth Path
Along the balanced growth path we seek an allocation of labor that is constant
across sectors and growth rates of the stock of ideas in each sector such that their
ratio is constant. Along the growth path, both domestically developed and copied
technologies contribute to the stock of knowledge. This implies that the externality
must depend (as is implied) on both nd and nf . To assure that growth is positive,
and non-increasing in the long run, f must be linearly homogeneous in its arguments.
If f were increasing returns to scale, marginal technologies would have a larger effect
on the cost of developing new ones, which would lead to an increasing rate of growth.





Given a fixed supply of labor, these can be combined to yield






























An example economy would proceed as follows: The economy starts with an
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endowment of technology (nf and nd arbitrarily small). Given the wage rate w which
is nominally constant, entrepreneurs copy foreign technologies, which are reverse
engineered to produce variety nf of the intermediate inputs. New technologies reduce
the cost of producing new ones at a constant rate, determined by f .





= g. This permits us
































→ g and the ratio nd
nf
> 0 parameterizes
the domestic to foreign technologies in equilibrium. The result in this model is
analogous to that obtained in Grossman and Helpman[34] with some minor technical
modifications.
The rate of growth is increasing in the population at large, an artifact of this
framework that constitutes a well-known empirical irregularity. It is also decreasing
in the cost of development, and an increasing function of a subsidy in either sector.
However, because the government must balance its budget, the effect of a change in
the subsidy to one sector must account for the corresponding decrease in the level of
the subsidy to the other sector. This is addressed shortly.
The cost of reverse engineering technologies is the focal point of the paper.
When b is higher, a larger share of the workforce is employed adopting foreign
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technologies. As can be seen from 2.20 this corresponds to a higher share
of aggregate expenditure on foreign-derived intermediate goods. Because the
externality generated by each activity is subject to a decreasing spillover, this
amounts to a lower rate of economic growth when δ is high (i.e. domestic technologies
generate a larger externality).
The rate of growth depends critically on δ and its relationship with b and a.
A high value of δ implies that domestic technologies bear a greater contribution to
the stock of public knowledge. In this case, the rate of growth will be higher when
a is low relative to b, or when domestic research and development is less costly than
copying ideas. The opposite case obtains when δ is low. When foreign technologies
have a greater effect on the stock of public knowledge, growth will be high only when
b is low relative to a.
The interplay between a, b and δ is important because it provides a more
flexible description of the various growth outcomes experience by import-substituting
countries. For growth to be high, it must be the case that the social returns (δ)
vary positively with the least-cost source of innovation. When the social returns to
domestic technologies are high, but the cost of local development is high relative to
copying, then growth will suffer.
It is worth noting that the model does not incorporate dynamic policy as in
Melitz [56]. This is primarily a modeling convenience, but does have implications
with respect to the model’s interpretation relative to its historical motivation.
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Import-substitution policies of the sort discussed in this paper were intended as
temporary measures, to be repealed once industrialization had taken root. These
can be theoretically justified in the presence of learning-by-doing, or externalities
that allow a tradeoff between future gains and present costs. The present model
does not incorporate the mechanisms necessary to justify temporary policy.
2.4. Government Policy
The point of departure of the paper was that government may support
technological development with the intent of promoting growth, but that those
policies may be counter-productive. As a simple means of exploring this, consider
an ad valorem tax levied on expenditures that can be used to subsidize the cost of
technological development in either sector. The normalization in 2.18 implies that
nominal expenditures are always unity, so the amount of tax revenue collected is
equal to the tax rate, τ . Given nominal tax revenue of τ , the government may
provide a subsidy σi, i ∈ {d, f} to either sector such that the government maintains
a balanced budget. The subsidy is provided to the cost of research (or copying in the
case of foreign technologies) as a subsidy to the wage rate, lowering the fixed cost of


























Thus, the cost (corresponding decrease in the subsidy to domestic research
and development) of an increase in the subsidy to reverse engineering is increasing











low, it is consistent with a country in which domestic research is both productive
and developed (nd is high), and reverse engineering is rather unproductive and
undeveloped (nf is low). In this case a subsidy requires a very small cost in terms of





are high, implies that the
country is effectively backwards. That is, domestic research is costly and undeveloped
(nd low) and copying ideas is productive and well-practiced (nf high).
It follows that when a country that is relatively good at, and has substantial
practice, copying ideas, the act of subsidizing that sector is much more costly in
terms of foregone research elsewhere. This is largely because of the diminishing
marginal contribution of new technologies to the stock of knowledge capital. When
many ideas have been developed in one research sector, the marginal ‘product’ in the
other sector becomes high, and thus the cost of a subsidy (even if the country has
a comparative advantage in the subsidized sector) becomes high. Depending on the
parameters of the model, this can have a deleterious effect on overall growth, and
helps to explain why countries who subsidize an activity for which they are thought
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to have a comparative advantage are doing far more harm than good.
The effect of a marginal change in the subsidy provided to the reverse
engineering sector can be seen by differentiating (24) with respect to σf and















which is positive iff a > b. Put quite simply, if the cost of domestic development is
relatively high, then a subsidy will increase the rate of growth. The opposite is true
if b is large relative to a. Thus, policies aimed at domestic industrial development
will have the intended effect if and only if the cost of adopting foreign technologies
is small relative to the cost of developing them domestically.
2.5. Empirics
The model and preceding discussion suggest that if an economy faces a
relatively high cost of adopting foreign technologies then the degree of crowding
out will be higher and thus economic growth will be slower. Moreover, policies
that promote imported intermediate goods will exacerbate this effect. This section
uses data to examine whether this pattern is consistent with trends in economic
development over the past several decades.
There are some limits to exploring this. The policies used to favor specific
imports (effectively subsidizing industrial growth) varied greatly. The direct use
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of a subsidy and the resultant effect on trade volumes was less common than the
use of currency manipulation (multiple exchange rates, rationed foreign exchange,
etc.). However, the intent is merely to test for evidence suggesting that reliance
on imported technology under the premise of import-substitution may have a
differential impact on output growth rates.
The argument made is that policies to advance economic growth pursued by
import-substituting countries will be counter productive when the costs of reverse
engineering or adopting are higher. As this is undertaken by copying foreign
technologies, I will use bi-lateral trade volumes as a proxy for the flow of technology
between countries. This is consistent with the notion of embodied technology,
where the extent to which one country may absorb the technology of another
is a function of the volume of goods imported, often controlling for the type of
good. Moreover, the effect of embodied technology on economic growth has been
documented widely (see Keller [43], and Coe and Helpman [18] for examples), and
has been shown to have a positive effect on economic growth rates. This chapter
argues that this effect is a function of human capital. Countries with a relatively
low cost of adopting foreign technologies may benefit in the form of higher growth
rates, whereas countries with a high cost may see adverse effects.
The specific treatment of the cost of adopting foreign technologies is important.
As a proxy for this, I will use education levels as reported in the recently available
Barro-Lee 2010 [7] dataset on educational attainment. The dataset provides mean
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years of schooling by category for the population 15 years and older at five year
intervals for a panel of 138 countries. I use the difference between the education
levels of the exporting and importing countries as a means of controlling for the
cost of adopting a foreign technology. Intuitively, when the gap in education levels
is larger, the cost of adopting will be higher, and will thus bear a negative impact
on growth.
2.5.1 Data
Data on trade volumes is sourced from the Feenstra United Nations world
bilateral trade dataset. This data set provides bilateral trade volumes by 4-digit
SITC code from 1962 to 2008, which allows us to consider the impact of specific
sectors, i.e. whether the manufacturing sector has a more relevant impact, on
average, than trade in general. In addition, they provide all trade volumes in
constant-price international dollars, so that no further modifications are necessary.
Data on real GDP growth rates and levels is from the Penn World tables v6.2.
When constructing the growth rate, I calculate the average of the growth rates for
the 5-year period beginning with the sample year. This has the effect of ignoring the
instantaneous effects of both education and technology absorption on growth, and
instead considers the average effect over the subsequent five year period. I find this
intuitively appealing, as the effect of any variable on the rate of growth of economic
61
output may take some time. In addition, by using the subsequent five year period,
we avoid worrying about reverse causation, as future growth is unlikely to impact
current trade volumes or education levels. Moreover, as the education data is only
available at 5 year intervals, it is a conservative approach to including the growth
data, as including only those years for which there is education data available could
likely generate spurious results.
The education data, again, is from Barro-Lee 2010 panel data set on education.
The average years of education for the population 15 and older is used, primarily
because it is the most general measure of education and suffers from few missing
values relative to other variables in the dataset. Years of primary, secondary and
tertiary schooling are used as robustness checks.
Countries are grouped by income level in an effort to uncover the differential
effect by level of development. For the baseline regression, countries are grouped
into income groups as defined by the World ank. Low income countries are those
with per capita GDP less than $3,946, middle income up to $12,196 and high
income in excess of $12,196. The model is also conditioned on those countries that
have consistently been labeled import-substituters. The list of import substituting
countries is based on anecdotal evidence from several papers. Bruton[14] discusses
Brazil, India and South Korea at length. Hirschman [39] lists Brazil, Mexico
and Columbia, as well as India and Pakistan as countries that offered protective
policies to import-competing sectors. Argentina, per Pablo [20] presents another
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well known case of import-substituting policies. Out of these countries, Brazil,
Mexico, India, Argentina, Pakistan and South Korea ared included in the import
substitution category. The list of countries for each regression is listed in Appendix C.
2.5.2 Testing
The hypothesis is that the rate of per capita GDP growth will depend negatively
on the cost of adopting technologies. As a proxy for the cost of adopting a technology
I use the gap in education levels. Countries that imported crucial intermediate goods
from exporters who are relatively advanced technologically (and thus in terms of
education levels) face a higher cost of adoption, and thus a slower rate of technological
and output growth.
To test the hypothesis I run the following empirical model:








The variables are abbreviated as follows: gr avg is the 5-year average of real
per capita GDP growth as recovered from the Penn World Tables, Trade Vol. is
the volume of trade between countries i and e (i denotes importer, and e exporter).
Educ is the years of education for the population over 15.
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Real per capita GDP is included to account for the typical effect that income
levels have on growth rates. I include the interaction between trade volumes by
sector and the educational gap because I expect that the impact on growth that
the gap between trading partners will have will be an increasing function of the
volume of trade between them. However, I condition on the level of education of the
importing to account for the fact that education levels alone will have a significant
effect on economic growth rates.
The empirical specification is subject to some caveats. The use of trade
volumes is an imperfect measure of import-substitution, and when applied to
aggregate trade volumes is an imperfect measure of intermediate input use. This
second concern is ameliorated by running the regression including only those sectors
that can be accurately classified as intermediate industrial goods, and observing
consistent results. The first concern begets the reminder that the purpose of the
regression is to provide some cursory evidence that increases in trade volumes
and the associated level of embodied technology have a variable impact on future
growth rates. This provides some evidence that policies with this aim may be
counterproductive.
Results from the baseline regression, which includes all trade categories, are
presented in Table 6. For this regression I use average years of primary schooling as
the education variable and in the construction of the VAR variable.
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Dep. Variable: gr avgb
Pooled Low Middle High ISI
income income income
log(intercept) 4.520 0.472 5.100 22.442 8.449
(0.163) (0.332) (0.789) (2.461) (0.868)
log(real pcGDP) −0.406 0.204 −0.518 −2.743 −0.601
(0.022) (0.044) (0.081) (0.220) (0.091)
log(Educ) 1.141 0.398 1.452 4.521 −0.613
(0.037) (0.051) (0.088) (0.146) (0.139)
log(VAR) a −0.041 −0.060 −0.018 0.018 −0.054
(0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.014) (0.011)
R2 0.0219 0.008 0.0386 0.422 0.164
FStat 186.8 40.51 101.3 545.7 71.94
TABLE 6. Baseline Regression (Full Sample)





, Educ = pop. avg. years primary education
b standard errors in parenthesis
The evidence in the regression supports the hypothesis: that growth rates depend
negatively on the cost of adopting foreign technology, where the cost is proxied for by
the difference in education levels of the exporting and importing country. What is more
interesting is that the effect differs across income levels. Poor and middle income countries
experience growth that is, on average, .06 and .018 point lower growth respectively during
the subsequent five year period. Rich countries seem to be unaffected, as the coefficient for
that set is not significantly different than zero. ISI countries experience an effect that is
more negative, on average, than the full sample, despite the fact that they qualify as lower
to middle income. This indicates that they are, in fact, outliers.
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Further, we can estimate the regression including only industrial intermediate goods.
This includes the SITC 4 categories under machinery and transport equipment, and
includes all general industrial and machinery goods (categories beginning with 7 in the 4-
digit classification). Estimating the regression using this subset is tantamount to including
a sector fixed effect, but because there is substantial interest in this sector pursuant to
the discussion in this chapter, it is presented as a stand-alone regression. The results are
presented in Table 7.
Dep. Variable: gr avg b
Pooled Low Middle High ISI
income income income
log(intercept) 4.678 0.465 3.949 20.736 8.613
(0.206) (0.412) (0.998) (3.144) (0.842)
log(real pcGDP) -0.433 0.214 -0.489 -2.636 -0.713
(0.027) (0.054) (0.103) (0.282) (0.211)
log(Educ) 1.108 0.282 1.9224 4.614 -0.494
(0.048) (0.064) (0.113) (0.192) (0.200)
log(VAR)a -0.034 -0.062 -0.013 0.071 -0.051
(0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.017) (0.018)
R2 0.024 0.011 0.025 0.429 0.153
FStat 326.7 84.51 108.7 881.4 74.89
TABLE 7. SITC4 category 7





, Educ = pop. avg. years primary education
b standard errors in parenthesis
The results in Table 7 validate our priors. When the sample is limited to trade
in manufactured intermediate goods, the effect is slightly stronger for low income, high
income and ISI countries. The regressions retain or improve upon their significance levels.
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The change in the magnitude of the coefficients is as suspected, and we can conclude that
dependence on import categories for which embodied technology is theoretically high has
a negative impact on subsequent output growth rates.
Two final robustness checks provide some additional insight. First, I condition
the sample such that the education level of the exporting country is greater than the
education level of the importing country. This separates the marginal impact of trade
with a more advanced exporting partner when the exporting partner already has a higher
level of human capital. The results are consistent with the results presented in Tables
1 and 2, though they do report a negative effect for all country groups. This suggests
that an advanced economy benefits from a marginally more advanced exporting partner
when the exporter has a lower level of human capital than the importer. This regression
also reports that the set of import-substituting countries has a more negative effect than
even the set of low-income countries, lending further credence to the suggestion that they
suffered disproportionately from increases in trade with more advanced economies.
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Dep. Variable: gr avg b
Pooled Low Middle High ISI
income income income
log(intercept) 4.578 0.142 -0.247 23.109 9.371
(0.231) (0.392) (1.527) (4.303) (0.742)
log(real pcGDP) -0.437 0.214 -0.238 -2.818 -0.913
(0.030) (0.052) (0.162) (0.379) (0.119)
log(Educ) 0.987 0.256 3.240 5.109 -0.234
(0.052) (0.061) (0.183) (0.292) (0.155)
log(VAR)a -0.013 -0.026 -0.023 -0.009 -0.031
(0.008) (0.010) (0.015) (0.032) (0.022)
R2 0.017 0.005 0.0766 0.3778 0.123
FStat 122.8 27.79 104.4 291.5 72.08
TABLE 8. Educe >Educi





, Educ = pop. avg. years primary education
b standard errors in parenthesis
An additional robustness check uses the level of secondary education in the
construction of VAR, as well as the primary control in the regression. Use of secondary
education rates has a small and insignificant effect on the magnitude and significance of
the variables. Once again, the effect for high-income countries is negligible, and the effect
for the ISI countries is negative and larger in magnitude than for the full sample. This
implies the the results are robust to alternative measures of education as a proxy for
technology level, and across income groups.
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Dep. Variable: gr avg b
Pooled Low Middle High ISI
income income income
log(intercept) 6.749 2.346 16.823 48.531 15.001
(0.212) (0.365) (0.904) (2.673) (0.904)
log(real pcGDP) −0.500 0.059 −1.581 −4.838 −1.401
(0.024) (0.043) (0.096) (0.243) (0.111)
log(Educ) 0.782 0.453 1.319 2.125 1.112
(0.027) (0.034) (0.060) (0.162) (0.162)
log(VAR)a −0.064 −0.086 −0.039 0.016 −0.078
(0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.014) (0.012)
R2 0.022 0.017 0.042 0.309 0.134
FStat 302.7 139.1 183.2 522.7 96.71





, Educ = pop. avg. years secondary education
b standard errors in parenthesis
TABLE 9. Educ = yrs. secondary education
Finally, I split the sample into pre- and post-1985. This split is meant to capture
a difference in international policy, and to test for differences by identifying post-1985
as an era under which globalization resulted in the mass production of final goods in
underdeveloped countries. The results are presented in Table 10.
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Dep. Variable: gr avg b
Pooled Low Middle High ISI
income income income
Pre-1985
log(intercept) 9.653 −1.41 19.578 67.225 9.093
(0.261) (0.464) (1.287) (8.622) (0.823)
log(real pcGDP) −1.042 0.443 −2.089 5.873 −0.675
(0.034) (0.061) (0.135) (0.782) (0.115)
log(Educ) 1.613 0.445 1.967 1.08 −0.549
(0.050) (0.062) (0.114) (0.807) (0.179)
log(VAR)a −0.046 −0.021 −0.068 −0.23 −0.060
(0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.56) (0.014)
R2 0.0645 0.023 0.094 0.158 0.119
FStat 428.4 98.04 204.3 27.27 80.62
Post-1985
log(intercept) 0.844 2.836 1.6185 −9.898 9.982
(0.240) (0.558) (1.2120) (1.829) (0.806)
log(real pcGDP) −0.078 −0.375 −0.063 0.832 −0.896
(0.032) (0.079) (0.1202) (0.169) (0.113)
log(Educ) 1.248 1.346 0.8163 2.241 −0.131
(0.082) (0.129) (0.1662) (0.109) (0.171)
log(VAR)a 0.008 0.031 0.0130 −0.027 −0.026
(0.010) (0.004) (0.0121) (0.008) (0.014)
R2 0.018 0.0127 0.004 0.1347 0.121
FStat 104.4 38.72 8.251 150.8 83.42





, Educ = pop. avg. years primary education
b standard errors in parenthesis
TABLE 10. 1985 as a discontinuity
There are some interesting revelations in these results. There is evidence for the
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notion that growth suffers, as the volume of imported goods weighted by education
differences has a deleterious effect on growth in the pre-1985 sample, but less so in the post-
1985 sample. The coefficient appears negative for all country-groups (though insignificant
for high-income countries) in the former sample, as is expected. However, the post-1985
group sees a postive effect for low and middle income groups. This can potentially be
a result of the end of policies (whether via fiat or via necessity) that supported large
volumes of imported intermediate goods. In the post-1985 sample, low and middle income
countries see a positive effect. Whether this is a result of lower costs of adoption due to
higher education levels or due to the end of associated trade policies is not evident.
Worryingly we see negative coefficients on the education variable. It is only significant
for the ISI group, in both the pre-1985 and full sample regressions. That higher levels of
education result in lower future growth rates is highly unlikely, and it must be the case that
this is driven by the size of the sample and the anomalous growth experiences of Brazil
and Argentina during the 1960 - 1985 period. Severe financial crises as a result of political
mismanagement resulted in periods of very low growth rates, despite levels of education
that were high relative to the sample.
Finally, the coefficients are reported for each component of the weighted trade volume
variable. The results provide some interesting insight into the difference between changes in
trade volumes and trade with more tchnologically advanced partners. For the following set
of regressions, the VAR variable reported in previous regressions is split into its component
parts.
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Dep. Variable: gr avga
Pooled Low Middle High ISI
income income income
log(intercept) 4.905 0.937 1.876 21.545 5.82
(0.171) (0.339) (0.857) (2.476) (0.786)
log(real pcGDP) −0.433 0.175 −0.310 −2.760 −0.435
(0.021) (0.044) (0.084) (0.219) (0.098)
log(Educ) 0.913 0.110 1.827 4.853 −0.513
(0.048) (0.066) (0.095) (0.162) (0.145)
log(VAReduc) −0.284 −0.378 0.261 0.386 0.288
(0.032) (0.048) (0.027) (0.080) (0.059)
log(VARtrade) −0.021 −0.037 −0.025 −0.007 −0.066
(0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.015) (0.011)
R2 0.025 0.012 0.174 0.4334 0.1744
FStat 260 74.77 140.8 670.4 147.6
a standard errors in parenthesis
TABLE 11. Trade coefficient
A surprising result is that for each country-group the coefficient on trade is negative.
The coefficient on education is positive for high-income groups and negative only for low
income groups. That it is negative for the pooled group must be driven by the low-income
group. This suggests that an increase in trade volumes has a poor effect on future growth
rates, and that, conditional on the volume of trade, more educated trading partners has
a positive effect on domestic growth rates, for middle and high-income countries, but a
negative effect for low-income countries. It does not penalize the group of ISI countries
in the sample, but does lend evidence that poorer countries, broadly defined, suffer lower
future growth rates as a result of trade with more human capital endowed countries.
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2.6. Conclusion
The intent of this chapter was to argue that the variable historical experiences
with import-substitution policies depend on the ability of a country to adopt foreign
technologies. While much of the literature assumes a costless flow of ideas, or that ideas
are readily copied, this chapter posits that those crucial differences in the cost of adopting
foreign technologies can explain why some countries were successful, and others were not.
It employs a simple endogenous growth model to demonstrate that differences in the cost of
adopting foreign technologies can play a significant role. In addition, it demonstrates that
seemingly benign policies to promote industrialization will have an adverse effect on output
growth under certain, plausible, circumstances. In addition, a simple empirical exercise
demonstrates that this effect is an empirical regularity. In a broad sample of countries, the
effect of import volumes, weighted by human capital differences, has an adverse effect on
subsequent economic growth rates. That is, growth suffers when a country imports goods
from a relatively more educated, or more technologically advanced, country. This effect is
exacerbated when the sample is limited to goods that are industrial intermediate goods in
nature, and carries greater economic significance for poor countries, and those that have
been historically labeled import-substituting industrializers. The empirical implications are
robust to alternative measures of education, and across income groups. Future research in
the area would include a role for macroeconomic policies instead of simple trade patterns,
as it is an effect that is collinear with the results in this chapter, but omitted for simplicity.
73
CHAPTER III
PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH: A GMM APPROACH
3.1. Introduction
This chapter applies an estimation procedure developed by Olley and Pakes [58] and
modified by Levinsohn and Petrin [52] to quantify the sources of productivity growth in a
sample of OECD countries. The first result of the study is an exposition of the sector-level
sources of productivity growth. It reveals that the distribution of productivity growth
is remarkably heterogeneous and transcends generalities. In some countries productivity
growth is uniquely driven by manufacturing, in some it is hindered by manufacturing, and
in others it is dispersed across the service sectors.
This provides an interesting counterpoint to the well-accepted point that service
sectors experience lower rates of productivity growth than other economic sectors. Baumol
[9] originally noted the relationship between the increasing size of the service sector and
related productivity slowdowns. His cost-disease argument provides an explanation of why
it is that wages in service sectors, which are inherently low productivity growth, can remain
high despite relatively low advances in worker productivity. This paper suggests that it
need not be the case that workers in service sectors are becoming less productive, and can
help to explain why wages in some sectors have advanced despite notions that they are
paid in under-productive sectors.
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The second result is a revised estimate of aggregate productivity growth. Estimates
of aggregate productivity growth implied by the procedure in the paper differ substantially
from those predicted using least squares. The estimator in this chapter performs better
in predicting aggregate productivity growth relative to least squares and provides an
econometrically robust estimate when calibration of the production function is not possible.
This result, along with the first, reiterate the value of data and measurement in assessing
economic performance.
The study of productivity growth at an aggregate economic level gained great
momentum with Solow’s seminal work in 1964. Not only did he define ‘total factor
productivity’ as we know it today, but he created the incipient framework for an analysis
of the variation in incomes and productivity growth between countries and across time.
Because of its flexibility, clarity and ease of modification it has been used extensively to
study the issue. As productivity growth is thought to be a necessary means of sustaining
income growth, the study of its sources and causes is an important, even if ancient, topic in
economics. Indeed, continued interest on the part the academic community, as evidenced
by ongoing research in the area, highlights the value of accurate measures of productivity
growth and its determinants.
Because of its transparency and elegance, the classical framework for studying
aggregate productivity growth is extremely popular. However, it suffers from a number
of known pathologies. Recall that changes in aggregate output in a classical growth
framework are the result of two things: the accumulation of productive factors and changes
in productivity, tantamount to an affine transformation of the functional relationship
mapping quantities of inputs to quantities of outputs. Measures of total (or multi-) factor
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productivity measure the difference between actual and predicted changes in aggregate
output conditioned on changes in the quantity of inputs. This typically originates with an
aggregate production function of the form
Y = AKαL1−α (3.1)
While this representation excels in generality it relies on several assumptions that are
somewhat misleading. The first is the property of linear homogeneity. That the production
function is constant returns to scale implies that each productive factor receives its marginal
revenue product. Or, per the above representation, that fraction α of national income
accrues to labor and (1 − α) to capital. One benefit of this is that the function can be
calibrated without relying on econometric estimation, as the division of national income is
a readily available statistic. However, this requires that each sector also be representable by
a similar constant returns to scale technology, which is a much more stringent assumption.
This introduces the next point.
The second assumption is that each sector within the economy, of which there are
obviously many, is not just of the same functional form, but parametrically identical. The
results presented in this chapter, and likely the reader’s intuition, suggest that this is not
the case. Intuitively one would expect that the share of factor payments accruing to labor
be higher in a service sector than in manufacturing which is indeed the case. Addressing
the cost of this assumption is one of the contributions of this chapter.
Given some of the assumptions necessary if one is to use an aggregate production
function to study changes in productivity levels, the process of relaxing them in a number
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of ways is appealing. The first step that this chapter will make is to consider the output of
an economy as being explicitly produced by a number of specific sectors. Of course, several
authors have addressed the economy at a disaggregated level, but this is an important
component of this study. In line with current methodologies, I will consider each of the 2-
digit ISIC categories as an independent sector. Using data from the OECD-STAN database
for structural analysis and the associated input-output tables, I am able to estimate
independent parametric production functions for each sector. This requires econometric
estimation of each sector-level production function, discussed below.
The second step is to apply an ‘appropriate’ econometric treatment of the problem.
As mentioned, calculating total factor productivity first requires that the production
function be calibrated. When using an aggregate, constant returns to scale, production
function this is an easy task, and does not rely on econometric estimation. The value of
α above can be imputed using the share of national income accruing to labor. Of course,
this assumes that gross domestic product and gross national income are identical, but has
been the de facto method of calibration for decades. However, at a highly disaggregated
level, the factor payments accruing to each input are not available in national accounts.
For this reason I implement a recently developed econometric procedure to address the
possible endogeneity of the regressors. The results, while similar to those suggested by a
naive ordinary least squares procedure, are different enough to produce alternative results
at an aggregate level. Not only do they suggest different estimates of productivity growth,
but they are more capable of matching the variation observed in productivity growth.
To make this claim I use data from the Penn World Tables on the growth rate of per
capita income. Provided that a country is on a balanced growth path (a dubious, though
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common, assumption) the rate of income growth is proportional to the rate of total factor
productivity growth, making this a reasonable approximation for comparison.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 provides a brief summary of the
literature on the subject. Section 3.3 introduces the data and section 3.4 discusses the
model used to estimate the technological coefficients. A fifth section discusses the results
and a sixth concludes the paper.
3.2. Review of the Literature
A summary of the literature on productivity growth surely merits its own paper, both
due to the sheer volume of output on the subject and the importance of the issue at hand.
Though the idea that growth can be ‘accounted’ for is nearly as old as the field of economic
growth itself, interest remains at a peak, as evidenced by many recent contributions to the
subject.
A principal contribution of the Solow growth model was that it provided the first
theoretical foundation for comparing measures of productivity across countries. Given
data on factor income shares, changes in the levels of primary inputs and output could be
used to determine the level of total factor productivity. The model itself could be neatly
calibrated using factor income shares at an aggregate level, and then used to study cross-
country differences in the level of predicted productivity. It is hardly worth noting that its
performance as a predictor of international income differences was rather poor, requiring
astronomical differences in the level of productivity to account for income differences of
much smaller magnitudes. Several modifications to the theoretical framework, including
the introduction of human capital and endogenous technical change provided frameworks
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that more closely aligned theory and data. A succinct summary of these trends, including
application to topics addressed in what follows, can be found in Hulten [40].
The extension of growth accounting to include intermediate inputs has its origins
in Hulten [41] who showed that total factor productivity growth can be expressed as a
weighted sum of sector-specific growth rates. Productivity growth in each sector and
Domar weights, the ratio of a sector total output to the total output of an economy, could
be used to neatly aggregate sector specific growth rates to estimate aggregate productivity
growth. Because a given share of the total output produced by a sector might be used
as an intermediate input elsewhere, these weights would generally sum to more than one,
and could be use to derive aggregate measures of productivity from information on specific
sectors. Jorgenson [42] relied on this procedure to estimate sector level growth rates for
the United States economy during the post-war era. His findings underscore the fact
that productivity growth, taken at an aggregate level, is not a very informative means
of addressing productivity in an aggregate economy. However, his empirical work relied
on the use of value added as a dependent variable and includes only capital and labor
as regressors. Later, Feenstra and Markusen [26] accounted for the expanded role of
intermediate inputs in output growth. Their work serves as a very useful extension of
the classical framework, but uses an intentionally mis-specified regression to account for
productivity. More recent work by Wolfl et al. [70], [71] highlight the extent to which
interaction between the different economic sectors influences measurement of productivity
growth. Her work indicates that the share of productivity growth due to the increased
use of intermediate inputs is substantial, and that the intermediate inputs channel is a
potential conduit for productivity. Much of her work is based on the same data used in
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this chapter, but does not include a formal econometric treatment of productivity growth.
However, because her work sheds important light on the increased role of intermediate
inputs in production, it provides much of the motivation for this chapter.
An important purpose of the study is to address the notion that the service sector
is the cause, or source of lower productivity growth rates in developed countries. A wide
literature, dating back to Baumol [9] documents the relationship between the slowdown
in productivity and the expanding role of the service sector. Oliner et al. [57], Griliches
[32] and Landefeld et al. [49] argue the the immeasurability of the service sector drives
a significant share of the apparent productivity slowdown. Indeed, questions of the
sort “what is the price per unit of service?” or “what is a unit of service?” remain
unanswered. How much of an effect difficulties in measuring service sector output will have
is remains an unanswered question, and this chapter is agnostic with respect to service
sector measurability. Data used to perform the analysis reports both prices and quantities
as measured by the OECD, and represent the best available measure known to the author.
With respect to the role of the expanding service sector in productivity growth the results
in this paper suggest that the question is more nuanced, and that the issue can only be
appropriately addressed on a country-by-country, sector-by-sector basis.
The literature on estimating production functions and productivity analysis is also
an active area of research. It is well recognized that naive ordinary least squares represents
an inappropriate econometric treatment of production functions. Because output and
inputs are simultaneously determined, estimates produced via ordinary least squares will
be biased. A number of creative methods, such as the stochastic frontier production
function introduced in Aigner [4] and implemented by Fare et al. [24], Griffith [31]
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and Sveiskauskas et al. [69], addresses the estimation of a production function in a
more theoretically consistent way, do not address the simultaneity inherent in the growth
accounting framework.
This chapter relies on procedures developed in Olley and Pakes [58] and modified by
Levinsohn and Petrin [52], and is the first to do so in a growth accounting framework. Their
estimator was originally applied to firm level data to address the potential endogeneity of
inputs when the dependent variable is output. This problem is equally present at the
sector level, and amenable to a variant of their estimator. The benefit of their estimator
is that, provided that some rather specific assumptions hold, the coefficients on a sector-
level production function can be estimated unbiasedly. This then permits an accurate
estimate of total factor productivity without relying on a calibrated production function.
Some potential shortcomings of the estimator have been addressed. Per Ackerberg [3] it is
acknowledged that the degree of collinearity is likely high. Indeed, collinearity in the model
is high, but I am able to estimate the coefficients with a comfortable degree of precision.
Because collinearity reduces the precision of the point estimates, but does not by itself
introduce bias, this is not much of a detractor in the current framework. Provided that the
assumed moment restrictions are valid, these estimates will be unbiased though measured
with less efficiency than theoretically possible.
The measurement of total factor productivity receives less emphasis than the
relationship between productivity growth and other economic variables. Common amongst
these are the relationship between research and development, human capital accumulation
and many trade related issues. Most studies take as given the measurement of productivity
growth, relying on methods discussed above. This chapter does not make claims about the
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important links between economic activity and factor productivity, but seeks to address
potential problems in its estimation. It is the author’s hope that more accurate methods of
estimating productivity growth will lend credence to the many factors driving the outcome
itself.
3.3. Data
I use data sourced from the OECD-STAN database on structural indicators. The
data available are a rich sample of yearly observations on sector specific variables for the
full sample of OECD countries. Estimation requires rather detailed information at the
sector level, which is not available for all countries. Because of this requirement, only
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Norway and Sweden have
data sufficient for inclusion in the study. Lack of data on capital stock and output are the
most frequent reasons for exclusion.
The intent of the paper is to estimate sector specific production functions including
capital, labor and all intermediate inputs. For this reason I use data on volumes of output
for each sector as the dependent variable. The set of regressors includes: net capital stock,
hours worked by employees and the volume of intermediate inputs obtained from the input-
output tables. It should be made clear that the use of value added as a dependent variable
is appropriate if the set of regressors includes capital and labor only, as is the case in
numerous other papers. When using a full set of regressors (i.e. all intermediate inputs)
the theoretical underpinnings of the regression require that total output be the dependent
variable.
The availability of input-output tables provides a means of disaggregating
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intermediate input use into the sector of origin. The STAN input-output tables provide
the current price value of intermediate inputs sourced from each sector, for each sector.
However, the tables are available only periodically. A maximum of three are available,
one each from the mid 1990’s, early 2000’s and mid 2000’s for each country. The lack
of data for the interim years presents a problem for estimation. To generate a sufficient
number of degrees of freedom I interpolate (linearly) the values for those years between
the first and last available dates. I then deflate the values for the previously missing years
using deflators provided by the OECD. Though this constitutes imputing data, it creates
a minimal amount of artificial variation in the process. Also, for the majority of sectors
the data suggest consistent trends in the use of intermediate inputs, implying that linear
interpolation is likely a conservative approximation of the data.
Two other modifications are made to recover missing observations. For missing values
of the net capital stock, values are imputed using a linear projection of the gross capital
stock. For missing values of hours worked by employees the values are imputed using a
linear projection of number of employees and number of persons engaged. Each of these
regressions have an R2 of very close to unity which for the purposes of imputing data is
desirable, and missing data constitute a minority of observations. Lastly, values for which
the quantity of intermediate inputs used are 0 are replaced with .0001 because logarithmic
transformations of 0 are not defined, though this occurs only once in the data.
3.4. Estimation
The approach of this chapter is to use the estimation technique introduced by Olley
and Pakes, and modified by Levinsohn and Petrin, to examine trends in productivity
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growth in the OECD1.
Consider the following (logged) production function:





it + γtt+ ηit + εit (3.2)
Kit denotes capital, Lit labor andX
(j)
it intermediate input from sector j used in sector
i. A time trend is included to capture variation in productivity due to the passage of time,
i.e. exogenous technological progress. Each input is characterized by its own peculiarities.
For example, labor use might be affected by union contracts which are persistent through
time, some forms of capital might be the result of investment decisions made a year ago or
more, and intermediate inputs will adjust with varying speed to unexpected information.
These idiosyncrasies are the motivating force behind the method of estimation presented
herein.
In any case, it should be apparent to the reader that the set of regressors likely suffers
from some degree of endogeneity. As observations on Yit are, in fact, equilibrium outcomes,
there is every reason to suspect that changes in demand, which partially determine Yit will
cause changes in the level of a given input used during an observational time period. In
recognition of this it is assumed that ηit is correlated with the right-hand-side variables,
while ε represents a classical disturbance. Thus, the regression immediately violates the
assumptions necessary for linear regression, and needs further modification.
Capital is assumed to be a predetermined variable. That is, capital cannot respond
contemporaneously to unexpected information (ηit). Unexpected changes to demand,
1The routine is coded in R, and is available upon request from the author
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or productivity shocks, occurring at time t may induce investment in capital, but that
investment is not usable until t+ 1. Explicitly
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It(ηt) (3.3)
All other intermediate goods may freely respond to current period shocks. That is,
labor and intermediate inputs may adjust as unexpected information deems necessary. In
this sense changes in output are determined entirely by variation in the levels of what are
termed ‘free’ variables. This clearly implies that all variables in the regression, with the




it = g(Kit, ηit) (3.4)
where again, ηit represents any unexpected information arriving at t. That the use of
input X
(j)
it also depends on the level of capital is an assumption. Larger is a given sector,
in terms of output produced, larger will be the stock of capital, and larger the adjustment
of intermediate input use as contemporaneous information deems necessary.
Provided that g(Kit, ηit) increases monotonically in both of its arguments, the
function may be inverted to yield
ηit = h(Kit, X
(j)
it ) (3.5)
In other words, the level of capital and intermediate good j correspond uniquely to
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the value of η which is observed at the sector level but unobserved to the econometrician.
The monotonicity of g is critical. If g is non-monotonic then Kit and X
(j)
it do not uniquely
identify ηit. The validity of this assumption is tested post-estimation.
The model can now be specified as follows (using j to index the intermediate chosen
as a proxy for the error term discussed above):





i,t +Ψi,t + εit (3.6)
where
Ψit = lnAit + αKit + γj lnX
(j)
it + ηit(Kit, X
(j)
it ) (3.7)
The choice of X
(j)
it is an important component of the analysis. The assumption has
been made that Xit may respond to unexpected shocks. As such, it should correspond to
an intermediate presupposed to quickly adjust to this information. In addition, a variable
with as few missing observation as possible is desirable. I proceed on the intuition that
service sector input is the most likely to adjust to unexpected information. This intuition
is based on the observation that services, broadly defined, includes machine and equipment
rentals, consulting, insurance and transportation of goods. Manufacturing consists of metal
products, many forms of machinery and rolled metals etc. that I assume respond with less
alacrity to unexpected information. The same applies for agriculture, where use of raw
materials may imply some delay. A second desirable characteristic of service sector inputs is
that they are more likely to adjust ‘smoothly’ to new information. Intermediate inputs with
large fixed costs, or lumpy input use characteristics, may not respond fully to potentially
86
minor innovations to η. Estimation using manufactures as the ‘proxy’ intermediate good
result in minor deviations in the coefficient estimates, but does not significantly alter the
results.
To estimate the coefficients for each sector across the sample I assume that the
technological coefficients are constant for each industry through time and across countries.
The benefit of this is that it provides a sufficient number of observations, and thus variation,
to efficiently estimate the model. Estimating coefficients for each country-industry panel is
impossible due to insufficient degrees of freedom (the model would have 13 coefficients and
11 observations). Furthermore, all of the countries in the sample are high income OECD
countries, so the assumption that they operate with similar technologies is reasonable.
Thus, for each industry I estimate 3.6 where Ψit is replaced with a third-order tensor
product polynomial in Kit and X
(j)
it . The coefficients on the polynomial are insignificant
at higher levels, indicating that this captures a large degree of the variation present. This
provides unbiased estimates of the coefficients on all coefficients X(k) and L, as well as an
estimate of Ψ. The aim then is to recover from the non-parametric estimate of Ψ estimates
of η, K and X(j).
As assumed, η is a first order Markov process, or
E[ηt|ηt−1] = φ(ηt−1) (3.8)
For each observational unit, a regression of Ψt on Ψt−1 yields Ψ̂t, the expectation of
Ψt conditional on its past value. Equation 3.6 can then be written as
87





it + γj lnX
(j)
it + αKit +Ψit − Ψ̂it + εit (3.9)
where Ψit − Ψ̂it denotes the unexpected component of the original error term. Let the
residuals from (9) be given by ε̂. The coefficients on X(j) and K are identified using the
following moments:
E[Kit|ε̂] = 0 (3.10)
E[X
(j)
it |ε̂] = 0 (3.11)
(3.12)
These moments imply that Kt does not respond to new information at time t,
and that the use of intermediate good j a time t − 1 does not respond to current
period unexpected information. These condition provide two additional moments for the
identification of the two remaining parameters. Levinsohn and Petrin use an additional
4 over-identifying assumptions. In exploring the use of additional restrictions I find that
little is gained in efficiency, and so use only one additional, that E[X
(j)
it−1|ε̂] = 0.







Statistical inference is carried using bootstrap.
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3.4.1 Results
The results of the regressions are presented in tables 12 and 13. For each industry
the coefficients suggested by the procedure outlined above are compared next to the results
from a naive OLS estimation, with standard errors in parentheses.
The most discernible trend is the level of significance attributed to the coefficients
at large by least squares relative to the proposed alternative. Least squares attributes
significance to a larger share of the coefficients, and does so at a higher level than when
endogeneity is addressed. Bias in the coefficient estimates is evident, though most retain
their signs and are within a comfortable distance of one another, which is reassuring. This
is largely consistent with the prior that ordinary least squares would result in artificial
high degrees of statistical significance. It is also worth noting that despite a high degree
of collinearity between the regressors in the above estimation, the degree of significance on
most coefficients is comfortable.
Negative values appear frequently, given that the theoretical underpinnings of the
exercise require that they be positive. As troubling as this might seem, it is an occurrence
in related literature as well (both Olley and Pakes [58] and Levinsohn and Petrin observe
this). Measurement error may play a significant role, and econometric mis-specification
is certainly possible. Negative coefficients most often appear simultaneously in both the
least squares estimates and the modified regression, indicating that it is not a shortcoming
of the methodology in the paper, but perhaps a result of the theoretical underpinnings or
data mis-measurement. Because of its history and consistency with the least squares result
I recognize this unpleasantry and continue.
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TABLE 12. Dependent Variable: Log Output
Agriculture Mining Manufacturing Gas/Electric Construction
L-P OLS L-P OLS L-P OLS L-P OLS L-P OLS
K 0.2724 0.2748 1.1336 0.8071 0.5445 0.5451 0.4378 0.3220 0.1346 0.2110
(0.0043) (0.0254) (0.0265) (0.0620) (0.0093) (0.0365) (0.0176) (0.0468) (0.0028) (0.0321)
L 0.0025 0.0603 -0.3361 -0.0311 -0.1392 -0.1655 -0.0653 0.0204 -0.0647 -0.0239
(0.0249) (0.0179) (0.0803) (0.0419) (0.0226) (0.0184) (0.0458) (0.0252) (0.0224) (0.0208)
Agriculture 0.0078 0.0438 0.0526 -0.1126 -0.1239 -0.0946 0.1196 0.1528 0.0770 0.0431
(0.0166) (0.0146) (0.0341) (0.0247) (0.0437) (0.0259) (0.0300) (0.0261) (0.0110) (0.0061)
Mining -0.0250 0.0434 -0.0068 0.0439 -0.0026 -0.0579 -0.1312 -0.0408 0.0060 0.1417
(0.0150) (0.0171) (0.0445) (0.0554) (0.0126) (0.0095) (0.0272) (0.0414) (0.0367) (0.0379)
Gas/Electric 0.4231 0.2379 -0.6930 -0.1144 0.2207 0.3742 0.8095 0.2905 0.5550 0.2658
(0.0333) (0.0242) (0.2308) (0.1499) (0.0524) (0.0469) (0.1358) (0.1495) (0.0831) (0.0802)
Manufacturing -0.2152 -0.1142 0.4224 0.1402 0.0160 0.1331 0.0337 -0.0033 0.0468 0.0293
(0.0374) (0.0374) (0.1094) (0.0529) (0.0314) (0.0186) (0.0437) (0.0557) (0.0361) (0.0287)
Construction -0.0028 -0.0483 -0.5300 -0.0573 -0.0438 -0.0703 0.1641 0.1809 0.0552 0.0437
(0.0304) (0.0333) (0.0854) (0.0297) (0.0134) (0.0124) (0.0669) (0.0507) (0.0187) (0.0131)
Wholesale 0.3219 0.4829 0.6030 0.1924 0.1767 0.0745 -0.6914 -0.1825 -0.1783 0.1197
(0.0563) (0.0650) (0.1718) (0.1371) (0.0710) (0.0224) (0.1187) (0.0968) (0.1039) (0.0879)
Telecomm 0.1537 0.1373 -0.4227 -0.0822 -0.1587 -0.1911 -0.5487 -0.4137 0.0138 -0.1028
(0.0285) (0.0331) (0.1349) (0.0714) (0.0455) (0.0438) (0.0947) (0.1216) (0.0470) (0.0414)
FIRE -0.0769 -0.1203 0.4712 0.1149 0.0859 0.0660 0.6795 0.5445 0.2057 0.1334
(0.0045) (0.0432) (0.0440) (0.1150) (0.0046) (0.0416) (0.0210) (0.0912) (0.0155) (0.0565)
Social Services 0.1391 0.0611 -0.0824 0.0544 0.3573 0.3084 -0.0016 -0.0721 0.0420 0.1103
(0.0400) (0.0288) (0.0737) (0.0637) (0.0532) (0.0436) (0.0637) (0.0939) (0.0315) (0.0251)
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TABLE 13. Dependent Variable: Log Output
Wholesale Transport/Telecomm FIRE Social Services
L-P OLS L-P OLS L-P OLS L-P OLS
K 0.49167 0.3862 0.4399 0.5409 0.3194 0.2625 0.2879 0.3005
(0.01142) (0.0343) (0.0066) (0.0521) (0.0015) (0.0194) (0.0021) (0.0383)
L 0.08522 0.0311 -0.0993 0.0634 0.0317 0.0627 -0.0260 0.0280
(0.01608) (0.0090) (0.0213) (0.0267) (0.0117) (0.0118) (0.0179) (0.0178)
Agriculture 0.06770 0.0104 0.0102 0.0133 -0.0046 -0.0132 -0.0259 -0.0550
(0.02214) (0.0151) (0.0083) (0.0097) (0.0095) (0.0051) (0.0132) (0.0170)
Mining 0.00295 -0.0688 -0.0169 -0.0087 0.0188 0.0382 -0.0465 -0.0705
(0.02674) (0.0146) (0.0090) (0.0099) (0.0095) (0.0065) (0.0102) (0.0120)
Gas/Electric -0.12561 0.2717 0.1444 -0.0597 -0.1705 0.0380 0.0967 0.1324
(0.09023) (0.0405) (0.0517) (0.0564) (0.0317) (0.0269) (0.0476) (0.0406)
Manufacturing 0.09119 0.0526 -0.0962 -0.5093 0.0914 -0.0026 -0.1035 -0.1199
(0.04772) (0.0444) (0.0439) (0.0627) (0.0233) (0.0222) (0.0275) (0.0259)
Construction 0.02210 0.0501 0.0224 -0.0106 0.0080 0.0595 0.0804 0.1572
(0.04116) (0.0243) (0.0386) (0.0441) (0.0171) (0.0170) (0.0199) (0.0223)
Wholesale -0.17453 -0.1907 -0.1930 0.1405 0.0098 -0.0618 0.0405 -0.1213
(0.04265) (0.0312) (0.0910) (0.0979) (0.0206) (0.0200) (0.0450) (0.0500)
Telecomm 0.01676 0.0824 0.1218 0.2472 0.2028 0.2925 0.0547 0.2648
(0.03446) (0.0286) (0.0407) (0.0522) (0.0323) (0.0220) (0.0510) (0.0374)
FIRE 0.30505 0.2181 0.5880 0.4744 0.2916 0.2315 0.4696 0.3079
(0.00929) (0.0373) (0.0042) (0.0692) (0.0016) (0.0248) (0.0086) (0.0369)
Social Services 0.30853 0.2168 0.0236 0.1394 0.2055 0.1301 0.1325 0.1295
(0.04139) (0.0208) (0.0337) (0.0241) (0.0220) (0.0210) (0.0192) (0.0175)
3.5. Productivity
3.5.1 Sector level productivity growth
The next step in the analysis is to address productivity growth. I first examine
productivity growth for each sector, and then proceed to the proposed Domar aggregation
to study aggregate productivity.
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For each sector, an estimate of total factor productivity can be obtained as follows:
ln Âit = lnYit − ln Ŷit (3.14)
In the above equation ln Ŷit is the predicted level of output given logged levels
of inputs and the coefficients estimated above. Once Âit has been estimated it is
straightforward to calculate the growth rate of total factor productivity, Ȧit
Ait
. Once the
growth rate of total factor productivity has been backed out, the aggregate rate of total


















k is the sum of final demand (i.e. GDP) and pjYj is the total output of
sector j. Because a share of the total output of a sector might be used as an intermediate
input elsewhere, these weights sum to more than unity. Intuitively, sectors for which a large
share of output is produced relative to GDP contribute more to total factor productivity
growth as increases in productivity reduce unit costs in ‘using’ sectors, resulting in higher
productivity throughout the economy. Given productivity estimates, I report the real GDP-
weighted average contribution of each sector. Alternatively, this measures the counter-
factual rate of GDP growth if the rate of productivity growth in all other sectors was zero.
The graphical results are in Appendix E. The results are presented in two parts.
First, the average marginal contributions for each country/industry pair is given displayed
2This identity is derived algebraically in Hulten [41] and is a common procedure
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, or the output growth
rate of a given sector normalized by real GDP. Alternatively, this is the rate at which
aggregate output would grow if output growth in all other sectors (not j) were equal to
zero. This has the benefit of weighting productivity growth by the magnitude of a given
sector, so that high productivity rates in small sectors are not over-emphasized. However,
because it represents an average over the sample period the growth rates for each sector are
regressed on a time trend and presented pairwise in the following tables. This information
represents the average growth rate of total factor productivity over the sample period. This
provides information about the trend of productivity growth which is hidden in the averages
discussed above. The reader should be aware that a high rate of productivity growth need
not imply that a sector will contribute significantly to the output of the economy. This will
further depend on the size of the sector, in terms of output and the level of productivity,
which may vary significantly across sectors.
In Belgium, output growth appears to have been driven almost exclusively by
productivity increases in construction. However, this is due largely to a dramatic slowdowns
in the productivity growth rate of the service and manufacturing sectors. Productivity
growth in the manufacturing sector grew at an average of 1.8% over the first 6 years in
the sample period, but at -3.1% for the final 5, which results in an average near zero.
Information for the other sectors is summarized in the coefficient from a simple linear
regression on a time trend, i.e. the average growth rate of total factor productivity for
each sector. Upward trends are evident for all sectors other than manufacturing and social
services, with relatively high rates of productivity growth in mining and gas and electricity
transmission.
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Output growth in the Czech Republic is led almost exclusively by the manufacturing
sector. It is also one of the few sectors that displays positive productivity growth.
Manufacturing in the Czech republic constitutes slightly more than 32% of output (cite
OECD online) which is high relative to other countries in the sample, and output growth
was strong through the sample period. Consistent with the service sector productivity
hypothesis, productivity growth has been negative in the service sector, despite increases
in output. Due to their small size, and low level of productivity it is not surprising that
there is little to be gained in terms of output through productivity increases in the service
sector.
Denmark presents a markedly different case. Estimates indicate that productivity
growth has been negative for all sectors other than agriculture and gas and electricity
distribution. However, increases in output are primarily driven by the varied service sectors
in the economy. Both FIRE and construction contribute more to output growth than
manufacturing, and wholesale only slightly less so. These estimates are contrary to the
popular notion that productivity increases in the service sector are insignificant.
Output growth in Germany is driven primarily by productivity growth in
manufacturing, wholesale and finance, insurance and real estate. Construction seems
to be a significant detractor to output growth. Like Denmark, the results indicate that
productivity growth has been on average negative over the sample period for most sectors,
with positive productivity growth in excess of 1% occurring in only two sectors: mining, and
gas and electricity distribution. Unfortunately, these sectors are too small for productivity
growth to generate substantial changes in output, as indicated by their minuscule presence
on the chart.
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Finland’s productivity growth is largely due to the telecommunications industry.
Because of the presence of industry giants like Nokia, and its title as the first country
to introduce a digital network for communications, there is little surprise that this is
observed in the data. As expected, manufacturing demonstrates a significant contribution
to output growth. The actual rate of productivity growth is remarkably high in both gas
and electricity distribution (though like Germany, this sector is too small to account for
much by way of output growth) and telecommunications.
Italy is unique in that it is one of the few countries where productivity growth in
manufacturing plays a negative role in output growth. This is in part due to the fact
that manufacturing in Italy actually contracted during the observation period, displaying
virtually no change in real output between 1999 and 2005. FIRE is the only sector that
experienced positive productivity growth and also generated the majority of output growth.
On an industry by industry basis productivity growth in Norway is consistently
negative. However, output growth is being driven by a relatively even distribution across
the 9 identified economic sectors. Combined, the service sectors account for the larges share
of output growth, though manufacturing accounts for the single largest share. Norway is
a bit of an outlier in that mining accounts for a much larger share of output growth than
other countries in the sample. However, Norway’s status as the eleventh largest exporter
of petroleum (producing slightly less than the European Union as a whole) make this no
surprise.
Finally, Sweden is consistent with the broad trend of the slowdown in productivity
growth, and output growth is driven almost entirely by productivity increases in the
manufacturing sector. Contributions from the FIRE and social services sectors are slight
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in comparison. This is perhaps the single result that is consistent with the prior of the
productivity slowdown in the developed world being due to the increase in the economic
output of a sector for which productivity growth is inherently slow, with the vast majority
of output growth still being driven by productivity in the service sector.
As seen, the evidence on productivity growth is an intricate story, with dramatic
variations both between and within countries. Generally, productivity growth is slowing
in pace over the 11 year sample period, and displays vast differences between countries.
3.5.2 Aggregate productivity growth
The second result of the exercise is the comparison of estimates of aggregate total
factor productivity using a standard least squares regression on aggregate variables, and
the disaggregated method using the results obtained from robust estimation. The variation
in productivity growth estimates suggest that bias in accounting may be significant.
To estimate total factor productivity from aggregate data, estimates are obtained
from the linear regression
ln Ẏit = ln Ȧit + α ln K̇it + β ln L̇it (3.16)
where (with an abuse of notation) Ẋ denotes the discrete time approximation of a rate of
change, Xt−Xt−1
Xt−1
. The regressors are constant price net capital stock and hours worked,
both at the national level. Once the coefficient estimates are obtained, the estimate of
total factor productivity growth can be calculated as
96
ln ˆ̇Ait = ln Ẏit − ln
ˆ̇
Yit (3.17)
It is well recognized that this regression suffers from simultaneity, and therefore
violates the assumptions necessary for linear estimation. However, when run on the full
sample of data, the estimates for α and β are 0.34 and 0.68 respectively. This marks an
insignificant departure from the standard assumed in the literature of α = 0.3 and β = 0.7.
These estimates of Ȧ along with the estimates of total factor productivity growth implied
by 3.17 are shown against the growth rate of per capita GDP as given by the Penn World
Tables. The Penn Tables report the growth rate of per capita gross domestic product,
which is equivalent to labor productivity growth if a country is on a balanced growth
path. The regression analysis carried out above calculates the growth rate of total factor
productivity. The two are identified by the inverse of the coefficient on labor for a given
regression, and the reported results are adjusted accordingly for comparison. A table of
the results is located in Appendix D
The benefit of robust estimation relative to naive least squares using disaggregated
data is generally quite evident. Compared to the simple least squares approach, the
procedure carried out in this chapter provides estimates that are generally a closer
approximation to the trends suggested by the Penn World Tables. Moreover, discrepancies
on the order of 2% are not uncommon, suggesting that bias in the estimates is potentially
very high.
An unfortunate by-product of the analysis is that the trend suggested by least squares
using aggregate data is clearly the closest match to the Penn data. I can speculate that
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this may be due to the fact that drawing a comparison between the Penn data, which is
real per capita income growth, and productivity growth requires that a country be on a
balanced growth path, which is almost certainly not the case. Of course, measurement
error likely plays a significant role in the results at hand, but whether it is sufficient to
account for the estimated differences is unknown.
These results suggest considerable gains in correcting for the possible endogeneity
of inputs in the regression framework outlined above. Some modifications might result
in more robust approaches to the estimation. For example, it has been suggested that
the error proxy term consist of a polynomial in multiple inputs, providing a more flexible
means of conditioning the regression on the endogenous error component.
3.6. Conclusion
This chapter applies an alternative technique to the estimation of production
functions with two purposes. The first is an exploration of the sector level rates of
productivity growth in a sample of OECD countries. The information gleaned from
this exercise reveals a remarkably heterogenous distribution of productivity across the
different countries in the sample. While productivity growth tends to be concentrated in
the manufacturing sector there are some notable exceptions, and evidence that the bulk
of productivity growth is often disbursed across what are often termed ‘service’ sectors,
though the patterns differ dramatically by country. This challenges the notion that the
service sector is inherently a low-productivity growth sector, and emphasizes the need to
measure productivity at disaggregated levels of output. The general lack of data for the
majority of countries in the sample is an important reminder of the value of consistent
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data at the many levels of aggregation.
The second purpose is the compare estimates of productivity growth derived from
the estimation performed in this chapter to both naive methods and some other estimates.
With regard to this, this chapter performs at times well and at times demonstrates
inconsistency with benchmark statistics. For a subset of the countries sampled the
estimates are capable of matching a much higher degree of the variation in productivity
estimates. For others it appears that naive least squares estimates perform better. These
comparisons are presented with the caveat that comparing estimates of per capita income
growth to factor productivity growth requires that the economy by on a balanced growth
path, which casts some doubt on the validity of comparison.
Future research in the area calls for the inclusion of imported intermediate inputs
in addition to domestic, and extension to the myriad frameworks capable of addressing
productivity growth. These, in addition to the current paper have the potential to provide





In equilibrium land is not traded, and cannot be produced. To determine the price
of land I calculate the shadow price of land as follows: Suppose that households could
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This equation can be interpreted as the present discounted value of the return from
a unit of land relative to the value of consumption.
Noting that the return to a unit of land in time period t is φāNt
L̄
and that the growth



















1 + γb − β
)]
(A.5)
Intuitively, the price of land is proportional to the population. This follows as the
amount of output that the agricultural sector must produce increases as the population
grows. This results in larger factor payments to land, and thus an increase in its value as
an asset.
However, because structural change implies that the economy is not on the balanced
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growth path, the above expression only applies when the economy has fully transitioned to
the industrial economy, with a marginal share of employment and labor in the agricultural
sector. In addition, because the shooting algorithm only generates the full equilibrium
time path for all variables in the last time period, calculating A.5 prior to the end of the
simulation is also incorrect. To solve this, the model is run initially for 1000 time periods,
generating the equilibrium prices and quantities. Using this first run, agents calculate
the price of land using equilibrium data. This ensures that agents are not using data ‘off
the equilibrium path’ when forecasting the price of land. As expected, the time paths
depart when the economy is undergoing structural change (initially) and as the simulation
progresses because fewer future values of GDP are available. I then rerun the exercise for
250 periods, using the first 250 values for the price of land. This ensures that the margin
of error is on the order of β750, or 5.05e−14.
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FIGURE 5. Aggregate capital stock
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FIGURE 6. Agricultural share of labor force
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Afghanistan, Albania, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Burundi, Cambodia,
Cameroon,Ghana, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Kenya, Liberia, Kyrgyzstan, Malawi,
Mali,Mauritania , Mongolia, Mozambique, Niger, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Rwanda,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tajikistan, Togo, Uganda, Yemen, Zambia
C.2. Middle Income
Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Belize, Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Croatia, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, Gabon, Guatemala, Indonesia,
Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Nicaragua, Mexico, Morocco,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Romania, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tunisia,
Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, Zimbabwe
C.3. High Income
Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Barbados, Canada, Chile, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Malta,
Mauritius, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Qatar, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
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Taiwan, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Venezuela
C.4. ISI















































TABLE 15. Czech Republic




















































































































































FIGURE 9. Czech Republic




















































































[1] Acemoglu, D. Why do new technologies complement skills?: Directed
technical change and wage inequality. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 113, 4
(November 1998), 1055–1089.
[2] Acemoglu, D., and Zilibotti, F. Productivity differences. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics 116, 2 (May 2001), 563–606.
[3] Ackerberg, D., Caves, K., and Frazer, G. Structural identification of
production functions. mimeo (2006).
[4] Aigner, D., Lovell, C., and Schmidt, P. Formulation and estimation of
stochastic frontier production function models. Journal of Econometrics 6, 1
(1977), 21–37.
[5] Barham, B. L., Boucher, S., and Carter, M. R. Credit constraints,
credit unions, and small-scale producers in guatemala. World Development 24, 5
(1996), 793–806.
[6] Barro, R., and i Martin, X. S. Technological diffusion, convergence, and
growth. Journal of Economic Growth 2, 1 (1997), 1–26.
[7] Barro, R., and Lee, J.-W. A New Data Set of Educational Attainment on
the World, 1950-2010. NBER Working Paper No. 15902 (April 2010).
[8] Bassett, T., and Crummey, D. Land in African agrarian systems.
University of Wisconsin Press, 1993.
[9] Baumol, W. Macroeconomics of unbalanced growth: the anatomy of urban
crisis. The American Economic Review 57, 3 (1967), 415–426.
[10] Benhabib, J., and Spiegel, M. Human capital and technology diffusion.
Handbook of Economic Growth 1, 1 (2005).
[11] Benjamin, D., and Brandt, L. Property rights, labour markets, and
efficiency in a transition economy: the case of rural China. Canadian Journal of
Economics 35, 4 (November 2002), 689–716.
119
[12] Besley, T. Property rights and investment incentives: Theory and evidence
from Ghana. Journal of Political Economy 103, 5 (October 1995), 903–37.
[13] Bridgman, B., Livshits, I., and MacGee, J. Vested interests and
technology adoption. Journal of Monetary Economics 54, 3 (2007), 649–666.
[14] Bruton, H. J. Import substitution. Handbook of Development Economics II
(1998), 1601–1644.
[15] Carter, M., and Olinto, P. Getting institutions ‘right;’ for whom&quest;
credit constraints and the impact of property rights on the quantity and
composition of investment. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 85, 1 (02
2003), 173–186.
[16] Claessens, S., and Laeven, L. Financial development, property rights, and
growth. Policy Research Working Paper Series 2924, The World Bank, Nov. 2002.
[17] Clemhout, S., and Wan, H. Y. Learning-by-doing and infant industry
protection. Review of Economic Studies 37, 1 (January 1970), 33–56.
[18] Coe, D. T., and Helpman, E. International r&d spillovers. European
Economic Review 39, 5 (1995), 859–887.
[19] Colistete, R. Revisiting import-substituting industrialization in Brazil:
Productivity growth and technological learning in the post-war years. Conference
on Latin America, Globalization and Economic History at UCLA (March 2009).
[20] de Pablo, J. C. Beyond Import Substitution: The case of Argentina. World
Development 5, 1-2 (1977), 7–17.
[21] Deininger, K., and Jin, S. The potential of land rental markets in the
process of economic development: Evidence from China. Journal of Development
Economics 78, 1 (October 2005), 241–270.
[22] Echevarria, C. Changes in sectoral composition associated with economic
growth. International Economic Review 38, 2 (May 1997), 431–52.
[23] Echevarria, C. A three-factor agricultural production function: the case of
Canada. International Economic Journal 12, 3 (October 1998), 63–75.
[24] Fare, R., Grosskopf, S., Norris, M., and Zhang., Z. Productivity
growth, technical progress, and efficiency change in industrialized countries. The
American Economic Review 84, 1 (1994), 66–83.
120
[25] Farmer, K., and Wendner, R. A two-sector overlapping generations model
with heterogeneous capital. Economic Theory 22 (2003), 773–792.
[26] Feenstra, R., and Markusen, J. Accounting for growth with new inputs.
International Economic Review 35, 2 (1994), 429–447.
[27] Galor, O., and Weil, D. From malthusian stagnation to modern growth.
American Economic Review 89, 2 (May 1999), 150–154.
[28] Goldstein, M., and Udry, C. The profits of power: Land rights and
agricultural investment in ghana. Journal of Political Economy 116, 6 (December
2008), 981–1022.
[29] Gollin, D., Parente, S. L., and Rogerson, R. The food problem and
the evolution of international income levels. Journal of Monetary Economics 54, 4
(May 2007), 1230–1255.
[30] Grabowski, R., Self, S., and Shields, M. P. Economic Development: a
regional, institutional and historical approach. M.E. Sharp, 2007.
[31] Griffith, R., Redding, S., and Reenen, J. V. Mapping the two faces of
R&D: Productivity growth in a panel of OECD industries. Review of Economics
and Statistics 86, 4 (2004), 883–895.
[32] Griliches, Z. Productivity, R&D, and the data constraint. The American
Economic Review 84, 1 (1994), 1–23.
[33] Grossman, G. M., and Helpman, E. Trade, knowledge spillovers and
growth. European Economic Review 35, 2 (1991), 517–526.
[34] Grossman, G. M., and Helpman, E. Innovation and Growth in the Global
Economy. The MIT Press, January 1993.
[35] Grossmann, V., and Steger, T. M. Growth, development, and
technological change. IZA Discussion Papers 2558, Institute for the Study of Labor
(IZA), Jan. 2007.
[36] Hansen, G. D., and Prescott, E. C. Malthus to Solow. American
Economic Review 92, 4 (September 2002), 1205–1217.
[37] Harris, J., and Todaro, M. Migration, unemployment and development: a
two-sector analysis. The American Economic Review (1970), 126–142.
121
[38] Hayami, Y., and Ruttan, V. Agricultural productivity differences among
countries. The American Economic Review 60, 5 (1970), 895–911.
[39] Hirschman, A. Political Economy of Import Substitution. Quarterly Journal
of Economics 82, 1 (1968), 1–32.
[40] Hulten, C. Growth Accounting. NBER Working Paper (2009).
[41] Hulton, C. Growth accounting with intermediate inputs. The Review of
Economic Studies 45, 3 (1978), 511–518.
[42] Jorgenson, D. Productivity and economic growth in Japan and the United
States. The American Economic Review 78, 2 (1988), 217–222.
[43] Keller, W. Are international R&D spillovers trade-related? Analyzing
spillovers among randomly matched trade partners. European Economic Review 42,
8 (1998), 1469–1481.
[44] Kiley, M. T. The supply of skilled labour and skill-biased technological
progress. Economic Journal 109, 458 (October 1999), 708–24.
[45] Kiyotaki, N., and Moore, J. Credit cycles. Journal of Political Economy
105, 2 (April 1997), 211–48.
[46] Kogel, T., and Prskawetz, A. Agricultural productivity growth and
escape from the Malthusian trap. Journal of Economic Growth 6, 4 (December
2001), 337–57.
[47] Krueger, A. O. Trade policy as an input to development. American
Economic Review 70, 2 (May 1980), 288–92.
[48] Laitner, J. Structural change and economic growth. Review of Economic
Studies 67, 3 (July 2000), 545–61.
[49] Landefeld, S., Seskin, E., and Fraumeni, B. Taking the pulse of the
economy: Measuring GDP. Journal of Economic Perspectives 22, 2 (2008),
193–216.
[50] Lanjouw, J., and Levy, P. A study of formal and informal property rights
in urban Ecuador. The Economic Journal 112, 482 (2002), 986–1019.
122
[51] Lee, J.-W. Government interventions and productivity growth in korean
manufacturingindustries. NBER Working Papers 5060, National Bureau of
Economic Research, Inc, Mar. 1995.
[52] Levinsohn, J., and Petrin, A. Estimating production functions using
inputs to control for unobservables. Review of economic studies 70, 2 (2003),
317–341.
[53] Lewis, W. Economic Development with Unlimited Supply of Labour. The
Manchester School 22, 2 (1954), 139–91.
[54] Li, D. D. A theory of ambiguous property rights in transition economies: The
case of the chinese non-state sector. Tech. rep., June 1996.
[55] Matsuyama, K. Agricultural productivity, comparative advantage and
economic growth.
[56] Melitz, M. J. When and how should infant industries be protected? Journal
of International Economics 66, 1 (May 2005), 177–196.
[57] Oliner, S., and Sichel, D. The resurgence of growth in the late 1990s: is
information technology the story? The Journal of Economic Perspectives 14, 4
(2000), 3–22.
[58] Olley, S., and Pakes, A. The dynamics of productivity in the
telecommunications equipment industry. Econometrica: Journal of the
Econometric Society 64, 6 (1996), 1263–1297.
[59] Pack, H., and Westphal, L. Industrial strategy and technological change:
Theory versus reality. Journal of Development Economics 22, 1 (June 1986),
87–128.
[60] Parente, S., and Prescott, E. Barriers to technology adoption and
development. The Journal of Political Economy 102, 2 (1994), 298–321.
[61] Park, W. International R&D spillovers and OECD economic growth.
Economic Inquiry 33, 4 (1995), 571–591.
[62] Rebelo, S. Long-run policy analysis and long-run growth. Journal of Political
Economy 99, 3 (June 1991), 500–521.
[63] Rodrik, D. Getting interventions right: How south korea and taiwan grew
rich. Economic Policy 10, 20 (1995).
123
[64] Romer, P. M. Endogenous technological change. Journal of Political
Economy 98, 5 (October 1990), S71–102.
[65] Ros, J. Development theory and the economics of growth. University of
Michigan Press, 2001.
[66] Rosenzweig, M., and Wolpin, K. Credit market constraints, consumption
smoothing, and the accumulation of durable production assets in low-income
countries: Investments in bullocks in India. The Journal of Political Economy 101,
2 (1993), 223–244.
[67] Roth, M. Somalia Land Policies and Agrarian Performance: The Case of the
Lower Shabelli. Symposium on Land in African Agrarian Systems (April 1988).
[68] Strulik, H., and Weisdorf, J. Population, food, and knowledge: a simple
unified growth theory. Journal of Economic Growth 13, 3 (September 2008),
195–216.
[69] Sveikauskas, L. Technological inputs and multifactor productivity growth.
The Review of Economics and Statistics 63, 2 (1981), 275–282.
[70] Wolfl, A. Productivity growth in service industries: An Assessment of Recent
Patterns and the Role of Measurement. OECD Working Paper 2005/4 (2003).
[71] Wolfl, A. Enhancing the performance of the services sector. OECD Working
Paper 2003/7 (2005).
[72] Yergin, D. The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power. Free Press,
1992.
[73] Yifu Lin, J., and Zhang, P. Development strategy, optimal industrial
structure and economic growth in less developed countries. Development
Economics Working Paper, 2007/29 (2007).
[74] Young, A. Learning by doing and the dynamic effects of international trade.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, 2 (May 1991), 369–405.
124
